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The NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program conducts investigations of fire fighter 
line-of-duty deaths and injuries to formulate recommendations for preventing future deaths and injuries. The 
program does not seek to determine fault or place blame on fire departments or individual fire fighters but to 
learn from these tragic events and prevent future similar events. 
The Program Objectives are: 
• Better define the characteristics of line-of-duty deaths among fire fighters 
• Develop recommendations for the prevention of deaths and injuries 
• Disseminate prevention strategies to the fire service. 
The enclosed investigation reports are examples of reports for traumatic injury and cardiovascular
disease deaths of fire fighters in the last couple of years. 
F2009-10 Career Fire Fighter Dies When Backed Over While Spotting an Apparatus – New Jersey PG 5 
F2009-27 Captain Suffers Fatal Heart Attack While Participating in Fire Department Physical PG 18 
Fitness Program – Mississippi 
F2009-29 Lieutenant Suffers Fatal Heart Attack During Fire Operations - Pennsylvania PG 30 
F2008-34 Volunteer Fire Fighter Dies While Lost in Residential Structure Fire - Alabama PG 43 
F2009-31 One Fire Fighter Killed and Eight Fire Fighters Injured in a Dumpster Explosion at a PG 71 
Foundry – Wisconsin 
More information about the NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program and a 
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Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation







A summary of a NIOSH fire fighter fatality investigation November 3, 2009 




(Photo courtesy of police department.) 

SUMMARY 
On January 2, 2009, a 57-year-old male career fire fighter (the victim) was fatally injured when he 
was backed over while spotting an apparatus on the fire scene. The victim was the acting captain the 
The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), an institute within the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC), is the federal agency responsible for conducting research and making
recommendations for the prevention of work-related injury and illness. In fiscal year 1998, the Congress appropriated
funds to NIOSH to conduct a fire fighter initiative. NIOSH initiated the Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and
Prevention Program to examine deaths of fire fighters in the line of duty so that fire departments, fire fighters, fire
service organizations, safety experts and researchers could learn from these incidents. The primary goal of these 
investigations is for NIOSH to make recommendations to prevent similar occurrences. These NIOSH investigations
are intended to reduce or prevent future fire fighter deaths and are completely separate from the rulemaking,
enforcement and inspection activities of any other federal or state agency. Under its program, NIOSH investigators
interview persons with knowledge of the incident and review available records to develop a description of the
conditions and circumstances leading to the deaths in order to provide a context for the agency’s recommendations.
The NIOSH summary of these conditions and circumstances in its reports is not intended as a legal statement of facts.
This summary, as well as the conclusions and recommendations made by NIOSH, should not be used for the purpose
of litigation or the adjudication of any claim. For further information, visit the program Web site at
http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/fire or call toll free at 1-800-CDC-INFO (1-800-232-4643).
5 
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and Prevention Program 
2009 Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation
	
Investigation Report # F2009-10
	
Career Fire Fighter Dies When Backed Over While Spotting an Apparatus—New Jersey 
night of the incident and responded in an engine with a crew of three to a reported working structure 
fire. While en route, the engine had received a radio message to forward lay and supply water for an 
elevated master stream.  Due to the location of the fire structure and hydrant the crew had to lay the 
supply line beneath a highway overpass. Upon arrival, the engine chauffeur had to drive around a 
police cruiser and tow truck in order to position the engine to an available hydrant. The engine then 
dropped off a fire fighter at the hydrant to prepare a forward lay when the incident commander 
advised them to do a reverse lay. The victim then exited the engine to guide the chauffeur while he 
backed the engine around the police cruiser and tow truck. The victim walked down the officer’s 
side of the engine and positioned himself at the rear on the officer’s side.  The fire fighter positioned
himself at the driver’s side front bumper.  The chauffeur was able to negotiate the engine around the 
police cruiser and tow truck without incident before straightening up to position a feeder line into the
scene. The victim walked backwards keeping eye contact with the chauffeur via the officer’s side
mirror. While backing, the chauffeur noticed the tow truck drive past him toward the scene. He 
focused his attention on the tow truck momentarily when he felt the truck run over something. A 
police officer yelled to the chauffeur to stop the engine because something or someone was just run
over. The victim was found underneath the engine just in front of the officer’s side rear wheels. He 
was transported to a local metropolitan hospital where he was pronounced dead.  The chauffeur was 
not cited in the fatal incident. Key contributing factors identified in this investigation include loss of
direct communications between driver and spotter, driver distractions, possible loss of footing by the 
victim, and possible failure of the automatic reverse braking system. 
NIOSH investigators concluded that, to minimize the risk of similar occurrences, fire departments 
should 
•	 Ensure that standard operating procedures (SOPs) are developed, implemented, and 
enforced on safe backing of fire apparatus (e.g., visual and audio communication, use and 
position of spotter(s)) and include adequate training and testing methods (e.g. written and 
practical tests) to ensure fire fighter comprehension. 
•	 Consider evaluating current safety equipment used on fire apparatus to assist drivers 
during backing operations and consider supplementary safety equipment (e.g., additional 
mirrors, automatic sensing devices, and/or video cameras) for further assistance. 
•	 Implement proper procedures for inspection, use, and maintenance of safety equipment 
used to assist in the backing of fire apparatus to ensure the equipment functions properly 
when needed. 
INTRODUCTION 
On January 2, 2009, a 57-year-old male career fire fighter (the victim) was fatally injured when he 
was backed over while spotting an apparatus on the fire scene. On March 30, 2009, the International 
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Career Fire Fighter Dies When Backed Over While Spotting an Apparatus—New Jersey 
Association of Fire Fighters requested that the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
(NIOSH) investigate this incident. On April 13–16, 2009, two safety and occupational health 
specialists from the NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program traveled to 
New Jersey to investigate this incident. The NIOSH investigators interviewed the fire chief and fire
director from the victim’s department, the engine chauffeur and fire fighter, and the fire scene 
incident commander. The investigators met with the New Jersey Public Employees Occupational 
Safety and Health Program (PEOSH) incident investigator and representatives and reviewed their 
photographs, investigative findings, and safety and health standards for fire department personnel.  
NIOSH investigators also met with representatives from the local fire fighter’s union and uniformed 
officer’s union. 
Investigators reviewed law enforcement investigative photographs and investigative reports, the New
Jersey State Police Commercial Vehicle Crash Report, the autopsy report, training records of the 
victim and engine chauffeur, and visited the incident scene. NIOSH investigators also spoke with 
investigators from the New Jersey Division of Fire Safety, local police and sheriff’s office, and 
personnel from the medical examiner’s office.
FIRE DEPARTMENT
The career department involved in this incident is comprised of 269 uniformed fire fighters. The
department has seven stations and serves a population of approximately 124,000 in a geographical 
area of 12 square miles.   
Although the fire department has provided annual driver/operator training courses that focused on 
several driving topics including backing, they had not developed and implemented standard operating 
procedures that will assist fire fighters in safely backing an apparatus. In March 1994, due to an 
increase in overhead door damage, a general order was issued that addressed procedures for leaving
and returning from quarters.1 In regards to backing, the general order states, “To ensure pedestrian 
safety and to stop the flow of traffic when returning into quarters, the apparatus shall be guided on 
both sides.” NIOSH investigators observed this general order being used while meeting with the fire
department. The State of New Jersey motor vehicle regulations do not require that emergency 
vehicle operators possess any special training or driver’s licenses such as a commercial driver’s 
license.
TRAINING and EXPERIENCE
The victim had been with this department for more than 28 years.  He had completed certification
courses in Fire Fighter I, Hazardous Materials Operations, Basic First Aid and Cardiopulmonary 
Resuscitation (CPR), and various weekly and monthly fire service-related topics. The victim had 
also completed various online and instructor-led training courses on the incident command system. 
7 
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The engine chauffeur had been with this department for more than 18 years.  He had completed 
certification courses in Fire Fighter II, Hazardous Materials Operations, Basic First Aid and CPR, and 
various weekly and monthly topics related to the fire service.  The chauffeur had completed various
online and instructor-led training courses on the incident command system. 
The victim and engine chauffeur had completed certification training on highway incident and traffic 
safety, a department-instructed fire apparatus driver/operator course, and National Safety Council’s 
course, Coaching the Emergency Vehicle Operator II–Fire.2 Both apparatus driver/operator courses 
focused on basic fundamental driving skills such as backing, turning, intersection safety, braking, and 
speed control. Written and maneuvering skills tests were administered. The engine was equipped
with an automatic reverse braking system when the vendor delivered it to the fire department, and the 
engine chauffeur had received initial training on how the system functioned from the vendor.  
EQUIPMENT and PERSONNEL
The victim was the acting officer on the engine along with the chauffeur and fire fighter. The 
apparatus involved in the incident was a 1996 enclosed cab engine with an automatic transmission, 
diesel engine, and an air brake system (see Photo 1).  The apparatus’ gross vehicle weight rating 
(GVWR) was 32,360 lbs. The engine had two axles with six wheels (two in the front and four in the 
rear). The engine measured 28 ft (length) x 8 ft 7 in (width) x 9 ft 5 in (height). The apparatus was 
also equipped with an automatic reverse braking system3 mounted to the rear step of the apparatus 
(see Photo 2). 
Photo 1. Apparatus involved in the backing incident. 
(Photo courtesy of police department.) 
2010 NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program – Selected Investigation Reports. 8     
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Photo 2. This reverse braking system is attached to the rear bumper of the apparatus and is 
designed to actuate the rear brakes when pressure is applied to the rubber sensor. 
(Photo courtesy of sheriff’s office.)
This automatic reverse braking system was developed in the early 1980s, introduced in the United 
Kingdom in 1983, and then became available in the United States in 1986. This reverse braking 
system was an optional safety feature that was installed on the apparatus prior to the fire department 
taking possession in 1996. The system aids driver/operators while backing an apparatus by locking 
the rear brakes when the system comes in contact with an object.  Note: The manufacturer’s manual 
notes that this system does not exempt the driver/operator from using conventional backing aids such 
as side and rear mirrors or spotters.3 The rubber sensor is mounted six inches beyond the vehicle’s 
rear end to provide an area where vehicle damage could be reduced due to the short distance traveled 
after automatic brake application.  The sensor has an air chamber which is sealed at either end. The 
air chamber detects or senses a compression of the wall of the chamber, as little as 0.05 psi, causing 
the pressure inside to increase and then transmit down to a control/switch unit which triggers the
brakes to actuate. The system is designed to operate when the apparatus is in reverse gear and 
backing at a slow rate of speed. The instruction manual recommends a function test be done after 
initial installation and at least once a week thereafter. For the involved apparatus, the last 
documented function test was performed in March 2008; at that time, the system was working 
properly. 
9 
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After the incident, the apparatus and scene were processed by local police before the apparatus was 
escorted by state police to the fire department’s headquarters. The apparatus was secured there until 
state police could perform a vehicle inspection. The state police performed a standard commercial 
vehicle crash inspection in the presence of a fire department mechanic and investigators from the
New Jersey Division of Fire Safety. Items inspected included the air brake system, brakes, steering, 
suspension, tires, lighting, and low air pressure indicators. The inspection was completed within 
three days of the incident and the apparatus was found to have no mechanical violations.  The state 
police inspection did not include an inspection of the automatic reverse braking system because it 
was an optional device and their investigators were not certified to test it. However, when pressure 
was applied to the rubber sensor while backing, the system failed to actuate the brakes. It could not 
be determined whether the backing system was functional at the time of the incident, but there was 
damage to the bumper and rubber sensor that could not be attributed to the fatal incident (see Photos 
3 and 4). 
Photos 3 and 4. Pictures show damage to rear bumper and rubber sensor. 
(Photo courtesy of PEOSH.) 
From these findings, the New Jersey Division of Fire Safety recommended that repairs be made 
before placing the apparatus back in service. The automatic reverse braking system control unit was
replaced following the inspection, and then placed back in service.  The fire department also 
inspected eight other apparatus that had the same reverse braking system installed.  Three of these 
apparatus had damaged or insufficient operating parts within the system that affected proper
operation. These three systems were also repaired. 
10 2010 NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program – Selected Investigation Reports. 
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TIMELINE 
The timeline for this incident includes the initial call to the 911 center at 0213 hours for a structure 
fire. Only the engine directly involved in the incident is discussed in this timeline. No en route times
were documented for initial responding units for the structure fire. The engine was part of the initial 
assignment dispatched. The engine’s dispatch, arrival, and key events include the following: 
• 0213 Hours
911 dispatch center received a call for a residential structure fire 
• 0215 Hours
911 center dispatched the residential structure fire assignment
• 0226 Hours
Engine on scene 
• 0234 Hours
Emergency Medical Services transported victim to hospital 
PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT 
It was reported to NIOSH investigators that the victim was seen wearing a full array of personal
protective clothing and equipment, consisting of turnout gear (coat and pants), helmet, rubber fire 
boots, and a self-contained breathing apparatus. NIOSH investigators were unable to inspect the 
victim’s gear because it was destroyed prior to this investigation due to biological contamination.
The turnout coat and pants were black with reflective trim and lettering. The turnout coat had 3 in 
reflective lime yellow triple trim stripes around the waist and chest of the coat, and at wrist and elbow 
locations on both coat arms. There were also (6) 3 in reflective letters on the back of the turnout coat. 
The turnout pants had 3 in yellow/silver triple trim stripes above the pant cuffs. 
WEATHER and ROAD CONDITIONS
The weather at the time of the incident was clear with temperatures below freezing. The incident
occurred on a municipal roadway underneath a turnpike overpass approximately 186 ft from the fire 
scene. The road surface was blacktop and concrete and was straight, level, and dry.  No construction 
occurred in the area of the incident and no concrete dividers existed to separate the eastbound and 
westbound lanes. The area was reported to have been well lit when the incident occurred. 
i i li i i i l i i 1 
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INVESTIGATION
On January 2, 2009, at 0213 hours, the 911 center received an emergency call for a residential 
structure fire. At 0215 hours, the 911 center dispatched a residential structure fire assignment which 
included three engines, a ladder truck, a rescue truck, and a battalion chief. The engine involved in 
this incident was one of the three initial engines dispatched.  The fire scene incident commander 
initially assigned the engine to forward lay a feeder line to supply water to the ladder truck for an 
elevated master stream.  Due to the layout of the incident scene, the engine had to lay the supply line 
underneath a highway overpass. The engine approached the fire scene from the west and was 
positioned at a hydrant approximately 300 feet from the fire scene on the other side of the highway 
overpass. The engine chauffeur had to negotiate around a police cruiser and a tow truck that were 
blocking the roadway. The engine’s fire fighter exited from the officer’s side to prepare the hydrant 
and pull the feeder line for a forward lay. The fire scene incident commander then radioed the engine 
and advised them to perform a reverse lay from the aerial truck so that the engine could pump from 
the hydrant. The victim then exited from the officer’s seat, walked down the officer’s side and 
positioned himself at the rear of the engine, officer’s side.  The victim guided the engine chauffeur as
he negotiated around the police cruiser and tow truck in reverse, repositioning the engine so that it 
was facing away from the fire scene. The fire fighter left the hydrant and then walked over to the 
driver’s side front bumper and positioned himself there to assist the chauffeur in backing as well.
Once the engine was straightened up and backing toward the fire scene, the tow truck repositioned on 
the driver’s side. The window, which was down on the driver’s side, allowed the chauffeur to briefly 
look over his left shoulder and observe what the tow truck operator was doing. Note: The chauffeur 
stated that he had maintained eye contact with the victim via the officer’s side mirror until this
occurred.  At the same time the tow truck was being repositioned, the officer of the aerial truck 
observed the victim walking behind the engine at an angle toward the driver’s side and looking 
toward the fire scene.  Note: It is believed that the victim was trying to get to a better vantage point to 
assist the chauffeur in backing the engine and may not have realized how close he was to the engine. 
The officer of the ladder truck witnessed what appeared to be the victim being hit by the engine and 
then stumbling.  As the engine continued to back up, the victim was run over by the engine. 
Witnesses interviewed reported seeing the victim fall down before being backed over by the engine. 
Note: The victim may have been contacted by the engine’s rear step, or he may have stumbled 
causing him to fall, before being run over. The chauffeur remembers looking in his driver’s side 
mirror and seeing a police officer waving his arms in the air and shouting, “Stop, you ran over 
something or someone!”  The chauffeur immediately stopped the engine and was directed by police 
to shut the engine down, apply the brake, and stay in the engine’s cab.  The fire fighter grabbed the 
wheel chocks and chocked the engine. The victim was discovered underneath the engine on the 
officer’s side, just in front of the rear wheels.  He was removed from underneath the engine by fire
fighters and police officers and then transported to a local metropolitan hospital where he was 
pronounced dead. Witnesses also noted that the back-up alarm and lights were operating when the 
incident occurred. 
12 2010 NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program – Selected Investigation Reports. 
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CONTRIBUTING FACTORS
Occupational injuries and fatalities are often the result of one or more contributing factors or key 
events in a larger sequence of events that ultimately result in the injury or fatality. NIOSH 
investigators identified the following items as key contributing factors in this incident that ultimately 
led to the fatality:
• Loss of direct communication between the driver and victim. 
• Driver distractions at a crucial time in the incident.
• Possible loss of footing by the victim. 
• Possible failure of the automatic reverse braking system to actuate the rear brakes.
CAUSE OF DEATH 
According to the county medical examiner’s autopsy report, the victim died from blunt force trauma
to the head, torso, and upper extremities.
RECOMMENDATIONS 
Recommendation #1: Fire departments should ensure that standard operating procedures (SOPs) 
are developed, implemented, and enforced on safe backing of fire apparatus (e.g., visual and audio 
communication, use and position of spotter(s)) and include adequate training and testing methods
(e.g. written and practical tests) to ensure fire fighter comprehension. 
Discussion: The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 1500 Standard on Fire Department 
Occupational Safety and Health Program states, “The fire department shall develop standard 
operating procedures for safely driving fire apparatus during nonemergency travel and emergency 
response and shall include specific criteria for vehicle speed, crossing intersections, traversing 
railroad grade crossings, the use of emergency warning devices, and backing of fire apparatus.”4 A
SOP on backing fire apparatus should include driver responsibilities (i.e., mirror adjustment and safe 
path of travel) and the use of a spotter(s). At least one crew member, preferably two crew members,
should be positioned to assist a driver during backing operations. A spotter should be positioned at 
the rear of the fire apparatus on either the driver’s or officer’s side so that they are visible in the side-
view mirrors. If more than one spotter is available, one can be positioned at the rear of the fire 
apparatus and one at the front or only at the rear, on either side of apparatus.  The use of more than 
one spotter will assist the driver in negotiating tight spaces such as alleyways.  The SOP should state 
that members assigned to assist in backing apparatus be in communication with the driver/operator
through the use of department-approved hand signals, one-on-one communication, intercom system, 
or two-way radio devices. To avoid confusion, it is important to designate only one spotter to 
communicate with the driver.
3 
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The National Solid Waste Management Association and the Waste Equipment Technology 
Association released theManual of Recommended Safety Practices, a comprehensive collection of 
safety practices for workers engaged in solid waste collection.  Refuse truck operators are required to 
maneuver around vehicles and structures and are faced with having to routinely operate their trucks in 
reverse on a daily basis. This manual details procedures specific to backing safely, acting as a spotter 
during backing, and working around mobile equipment.5 The fire service could adopt these safety 
practices for backing fire apparatus and use this manual as a reference to develop or evaluate their 
own backing procedures. 
Drivers need to make sure they maintain visual contact with the spotter(s) and stop backing 
immediately when visual contact is lost. Backing should only be resumed when visual contact is 
reestablished and the designated spotter gives appropriate direction to continue. It is important that 
the driver focuses on backing, is not distracted by dispatch traffic, and is not utilizing a cell phone or 
handheld radio communication device while engaged in backing maneuvers.  When spotters are 
assisting with backing a fire apparatus they need to stay visible within the designated side-view 
mirrors, stay away from the driver’s blind spots, stay clear of the fire apparatus’ path of travel, avoid 
walking backwards, and signal the driver to stop when a person or object comes within the apparatus’
path of travel or when the spotter needs to change positions.6 OSHA regulations require employers to 
train workers to recognize and avoid unsafe conditions that may be present in their work 
environments and to provide training on the regulations applicable to their work.7 
The United States Fire Administration’s (USFA) manual, Safe Operation of Fire Tankers states, 
“One of the most common types of crashes that can be traced to failure to follow SOPs is those that 
involve backing the apparatus.”8 During this incident, the fire apparatus was backing at the same time 
the victim was observed walking behind the apparatus at an angle.  The chauffeur was momentarily 
distracted by the movement of the tow truck, when this occurred.  A general order on backing into a 
fire station had been issued in 19941, but a comprehensive SOP had not been developed or 
implemented on backing.   
Recommendation #2: Fire departments should consider evaluating current safety equipment used 
on fire apparatus to assist drivers during backing operations and consider supplementary safety 
equipment (e.g., additional mirrors, automatic sensing devices, and/or video cameras) for further 
assistance. 
Discussion: Modern technology has provided the fire service with a variety of electronic devices that 
can assist in improving fire apparatus and fire fighter safety. Fire apparatus are currently being
equipped with additional mirrors, cameras, and apparatus-mounted sensing devices (e.g., infrared and 
ultrasonic) to aid in backing maneuvers.  Additional mirrors mounted and angled so that blind spots 
are eliminated can assist the driver while backing.  A rear-view camera mounted on the rear of the 
apparatus provides a view of the obstructed area (blind area directly behind the vehicle) on a video 
monitor in the cab. Sensor systems (radar or sonar systems designed as backing aids) provide an 
alarm in the cab when an individual or other obstacle is detected at the rear of an apparatus. A 
14 2010 NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program – Selected Investigation Reports. 
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combination of a camera and a sensor system may offer the best protection, especially on a congested 
fireground or at a motor vehicle incident. 
As in this incident, newer apparatus are being equipped with automatic sensing devices, often 
referred to as Backstops®, that will cause the vehicle’s brakes to lock up and stop the apparatus when 
the device senses contact with an object.8 This type of device does not prevent the crash but only 
minimizes potential damage from striking an object. Even though these technological devices may 
provide an additional measure of safety, they do not substitute for visible spotters.
Recommendation #3: Fire departments should implement proper procedures for inspection, use, 
and maintenance of safety equipment used to assist in the backing of fire apparatus to ensure the 
equipment functions properly when needed. 
Discussion: NFPA 1500 Standard on Fire Department Occupational Safety and Health Program 
states, “All fire apparatus shall be inspected at least weekly, within 24 hours after any use or repair, 
and prior to being placed in service or used for emergency purposes, in order to identify and correct 
unsafe conditions.”4 Written policies and procedures should incorporate a preventative maintenance 
program that will provide information on proper inspection, maintenance, and repair of apparatus and 
its equipment.  This program should also provide guidance for documenting, notifying, filing, and
securing maintenance checks and records, including requirements to place an apparatus out of 
service. Also, all operating and maintenance instructions and manuals shall be provided and 
maintained for those performing routine tests, inspections, and servicing functions.9 
The apparatus involved in this incident was equipped with an after-market reverse braking system 
which was mounted to the rear bumper. The last documented service test was performed more than 
eight months prior to the fatal incident. The manufacturer recommends the system be checked daily 
or weekly to insure proper operation.3 The system was found to be not working when examined by 
New Jersey Fire Safety Division investigators during the state police commercial vehicle inspection.  
However, the system was not tested by the manufacturer or a third-party certification facility to verify 
that the device failed to actuate the rear brakes. A component for this reverse backing system needed 
to be replaced to allow it to operate again. Note: It has not been determined beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the system failed to operate during the fatal incident or that the victim came into contact 
with the sensor, but these cannot be ruled out as potential contributing factors in the fatal incident. 
Three other apparatus within the fire department’s fleet also needed maintenance performed on their 
installed systems. 
5 
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Captain Suffers Fatal Heart Attack While Participating 
in Fire Department Physical Fitness Program – 
Mississippi 
SUMMARY
On October 21, 2009, a 54-year-old male career 
Captain was jogging alone on a paved trail be-
hind his fire station as a component of the Fire 
Department’s (FD) physical fitness program. 
The Captain was last seen by crew members at 
approximately 1630 hours. Approximately 35 
minutes later, a civilian found the Captain ly-
ing on the trail, unresponsive, and not breath-
ing. The civilian called 911, and a police of-
ficer was dispatched. Crew members heard the 
dispatch and responded to the trail. They found 
the Captain unresponsive, without a pulse, and 
not breathing. Crew members began cardio-
pulmonary resuscitation (CPR) while request-
ing an ambulance. Despite CPR and advanced 
life support administered on scene, en route 
to the hospital’s emergency department (ED), 
and in the ED, the Captain died. The autopsy, 
completed by the medical examiner, listed “se-
vere coronary artery atherosclerosis with acute 
plaque change: hemorrhage into an atheroscle-
rotic plaque and rupture of the plaque” as the 
cause of death. Given the Captain’s underlying 
heart disease, NIOSH investigators conclude 
that the physical stress of jogging probably 
triggered a fatal heart attack due to the acute 
plaque rupture of his right coronary artery. 
The NIOSH investigators offer the following 
recommendations to address general safety 
and health issues. Had the first recommended 
measure been in place prior to the Captain’s 
collapse, perhaps his underlying coronary ar-
tery disease would have been identified, he 
would have been referred for treatment, and 
his sudden cardiac death may have been pre-
vented. The third recommendation may have 
hastened emergency treatment after the Cap-
tain’s collapse. 
●		Ensure fire fighters over the age of 45 
with two or more risk factors for CAD 
have a maximal (symptom-limiting) ex-
ercise stress test (EST). 
●		Ensure fire fighters are cleared for return 
to duty by a physician knowledgeable 
about the physical demands of fire fight-
ing, the personal protective equipment 
used by fire fighters, and the various 
components of NFPA 1582. 
●		Ensure on-duty fire fighters exercise in 
pairs or within viewing distance of an-
other crew member. 
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INTRODUCTION & METHODS 
On October 21, 2009, a 54-year-old male ca-
reer Captain suffered sudden cardiac death 
while exercising during his shift. Despite CPR 
and advanced life support administered by 
crew members, the ambulance paramedics, 
and personnel in the hospital’s ED, the Cap-
tain died. The United States Fire Administra-
tion notified NIOSH of this fatality on October 
22, 2009. NIOSH contacted the affected FD 
to gather additional information on October 
26, 2009, and on November 10, 2009, to initi-
ate the investigation. On November 16, 2009, 
a Safety and Occupational Health Specialist 
from the NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investi-
gation Team traveled to Mississippi to conduct 
an on-site investigation of the incident. 
During the investigation, NIOSH personnel in-
terviewed the following people: 
● Fire Chief 
● Training Officer 
● Crew members 
● The Captain’s spouse 
NIOSH personnel reviewed the following doc-
uments: 
● FD policies and operating guidelines 
● FD training records 
● FD annual report for 2008 
● FD incident report 
● Police report 
● Emergency medical service (ambulance) 
incident report 
● Hospital ED records 
● Death certificate 
● Autopsy report 
● Primary care provider medical records 
RESULTS OF INVESTIGATION 
Incident. On October 20, 2009, the Captain 
arrived for duty at Station 3 at approximately 
1700 hours for his 24-hour shift. No emer-
gency calls came in during the Captain’s shift. 
At approximately 1630 hours, the Captain left 
Station 3 to jog on a paved trail in a public park 
approximately 200 feet behind the fire station. 
The Captain had been jogging on-duty since 
the FD began its physical fitness program 12 
years ago. He typically jogged at a pace of 5–6 
miles per hour (mph) (10–12 minutes to run 1 
mile). The temperature was 71 degrees Fahr-
enheit with 71% relative humidity [NOAA
2009], and the Captain was wearing tennis 
shoes and an FD-issued T-shirt and shorts. The 
paved trail covered a little more than one quar-
ter of a mile with some slight uphill and down-
hill areas. 
At approximately 1703 hours, 33 minutes after 
the Captain left the station, a civilian walking 
in the park noticed a person lying on the trail. 
She found him unresponsive and not breath-
ing. She called 911, and a police officer was 
dispatched. The FD Safety Officer heard the 
police dispatch and telephoned Station 3 to 
9 
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alert them of the call; the Captain’s crew mem-
bers (Engine 3) responded to the area, arriving 
just ahead of the police. 
Crew members found the Captain unrespon-
sive, not breathing, and without a pulse. Dis-
patch was notified, and an ambulance and the 
FD (Rescue 1, Deputy Chief, and Fire Chief) 
were dispatched at 1719 hours. Crew members 
began CPR and retrieved an automated ex-
ternal defibrillator (AED) and oxygen equip-
ment. The AED advised not to shock. Rescue 
1 paramedics arrived at 1724 hours and began 
advanced life support including cardiac moni-
toring, intravenous (IV) line placement, and 
intubation. Proper intubation placement was 
confirmed by breath sounds and verified by 
capnography [AHA2000]. The cardiac monitor 
revealed asystole (no heart beat), and IV medi-
cations were administered. The ambulance ar-
rived on the scene at 1729 hours, and advanced 
life support treatment continued. The Captain 
was moved to the ambulance, which departed 
at 1739 hours en route to the hospital’s ED. 
The ambulance arrived at the hospital’s ED at 
1751 hours, at least 45 minutes after his col-
lapse. Inside the ED, resuscitation efforts con-
tinued without change in the Captain’s clinical 
condition. At 1800 hours, the Captain was pro-
nounced dead by the attending physician, and 
resuscitation efforts were stopped. 
Medical Findings.The death certificate and the 
autopsy report, both completed by the medi-
cal examiner, listed “complication of coronary 
artery atherosclerosis” as the cause of death. 
Autopsy findings showed severe narrowing of 
sippi 
all three major coronary arteries, and an acute 
ruptured plaque completely occluding the right 
coronary artery. More complete autopsy find-
ings are listed in Appendix A. 
The Captain had a history of high blood cho-
lesterol although the exact date of diagnosis 
was not available to NIOSH investigators. He 
was prescribed a statin, a cholesterol-lowering 
medication, in 2008; his cholesterol levels in 
October 2009 remained elevated. The Captain 
also had a history of high blood pressure (hy-
pertension). The exact date of diagnosis was 
not available to NIOSH investigators. He was 
prescribed an antihypertensive medication, 
and his blood pressure reading was slightly el-
evated in October 2009. 
As part of the FD annual medical evaluation, 
the Captain had a “Graded Exercise Stress Test 
(GXT) - Bicycle Ergometer” test in 2008 and 
2009. (These tests had been performed since 
1994.) The FD contractor performing this test 
had subjects pedal on the bicycle at 50 revo-
lutions per minute. Pedal resistance was in-
creased by 0.5 kilogram (kg) each minute until 
the subjects reached 85% of their maximal age-
predicted heart rate, at which point the test was 
stopped. The contractor used a 12-lead elec-
trocardiogram (EKG) to monitor the subjects’
heart rate, and once the test was completed, to 
look for signs of cardiac ischemia. If ischemia 
was found, subjects were referred to their pri-
mary care physician for follow-up. In addition 
to pulse, blood pressure was measured every 
minute during the test and for 5 minutes during 
the test recovery phase. 
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In 2008, the Captain exercised for 4 min-
utes on the GXT Bicycle Ergometer when he 
reached 84% of his maximum heart rate, and 
the test was stopped. He had no chest pain, 
normal blood pressure response, and no isch-
emic changes on his EKG. Given his weight 
of 175 pounds, his estimated aerobic capacity 
(VO2) was 20.6 milliliters per kilogram per 
minute (mL/kg/min) or 5.9 metabolic equiva-
lents (METS) [ACSM 2007]. In 2009, the Cap-
tain exercised for 5 minutes when he reached 
87% of this maximum heart rate, and the test 
was stopped. Again, he had no chest pain, nor-
mal blood pressure response, and no ischemic 
changes on his EKG. At this time his weight 
was 167 pounds, and his estimated VO2 was 
24.8 mL/kg/min or 7.1 METS [ACSM 2007]. 
In 2008 and 2009, the Captain was “medi-
cally cleared under 29 CFR 1910.156, 29 CFR 
1910.134, 29 CFR 1910.120 regulations, and 
NFPA 1582 guidelines” [NFPA 2007a]. 
Prior to this incident the Captain never re-
ported angina; in June 2008, he had episodes 
of heartburn that were unrelieved by antacid 
medications. A scope (esophagogastroduo-
denoscopy) diagnosed nonerosive gastritis and 
gastroesphogeal reflux disease (GERD). The 
symptoms eventually resolved with Nexium®, 
a medication that reduces stomach acid secre-
tions. 
DESCRIPTION OF THE FIRE 
DEPARTMENT 
At the time of the NIOSH investigation, the 
career FD consisted of three fire stations with 
49 uniformed personnel. It served a population 
of 27,000 residents in a geographic area of 43 
square miles. 
Employment and Training. The FD requires 
all new fire fighter applicants to be 21 years of 
age, have a valid State driver’s license, pass a 
background check, pass a drug screen, pass a 
physical ability entrance test (PAET) (Appen-
dix B), pass a general aptitude test, and com-
plete an oral interview by a panel that includes 
FD members and a police officer prior to being 
ranked. The candidate must then pass a pre-
placement medical evaluation and a psycho-
logical evaluation prior to being hired. New 
hires are assigned to day shift during the 8–12 
week minimum standards training program 
for fire fighters. Once the member passes this 
training program, he/she is placed on a regular 
duty shift of 24 hours on duty/48 hours off duty, 
from 1700 hours to 1700 hours. The member 
then attends the 6-week State Fire Academy 
to be trained to the NFPA 1001 Fire Fighter I 
and II level. The member receives emergency 
medical technician (EMT) training at a local 
community college. The State requires career 
fire fighter candidates to meet the State Mini-
mum Standards and Certification Board guide-
line, which is the National Fire Protection 
Association (NFPA) 1001, Standard for Fire 
Fighter Professional Qualifications [NFPA
2008]. The Captain was certified as a Fire 
Fighter II, Driver/Operator, EMT, Fire Officer 
1 
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II, HazMat Technician, Fire Service Instructor 
II, Fire Inspector, Technical Rescue Specialist, 
and Incident Safety Officer. He had 22 years of 
fire fighting experience. 
Preplacement Medical Evaluations. The FD 
requires a preplacement medical evaluation 
for all fire fighter candidates regardless of age. 
This evaluation includes the following compo-
nents: 
●		Complete medical history 
●		Physical examination (including vital 
signs) 
●		Complete blood count with lipid panel 




●		Urine drug screen 
●		Resting EKG 
●		Chest x-ray (baseline only) 
These evaluations are performed by a physician 
contracted with the City. Once this evaluation 
is complete, the contracted physician makes a 
determination regarding medical clearance for 
wearing a respirator and fire fighting duties 
and forwards this decision to the City’s per-
sonnel director and the FD. The Captain had a 
preplacement medical evaluation in 1987. 
sippi 
Periodic Medical Evaluations. Annual medi-
cal evaluations have been required for all 
members since 1998. This evaluation includes 
the following components: 
●		Complete medical history 
●		Physical examination (including vital 
signs) 
●		Complete blood count with lipid panel 





●		Submaximal cycle ergometer test (de-
scribed in detail on page 4) 
These evaluations are performed by a mobile 
medical clinic. Once this evaluation is com-
plete, a physician traveling with the clinic deter-
mines medical clearance for respirator use and 
fire fighting duties, and forwards this decision 
to the City’s personnel director and the FD. 
Return to duty clearance is required for duty-
related injuries. The member’s primary care 
physician provides the fire fighter clearance for 
duty based on NFPA 1582, Standard on Com-
prehensive Occupational Medical Program for 
Fire Departments [NFPA 2007a]. If members 
are off duty for 48 hours (2 shifts) continuous-
ly for an illness, medical clearance from their 
primary care physician is required. 
22 2010 NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program – Selected Investigation Reports. 
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Health and Wellness Programs. The FD has 
a mandatory wellness/fitness program; exer-
cise (strength and aerobic) equipment is avail-
able in the fire stations. Health maintenance 
programs are available from the City. Self-
contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) mask 
fit tests are performed annually. Semiannual 
physical ability tests are required for all fire 
fighters. Fire fighters must perform at least 20 
sit-ups, 10 push-ups, and either run 1.5 miles 
within 16.5 minutes (VO2 of 35.7 mg/kg/min 
or 10 METs) or walk 3 miles within 45 min-
utes (VO2 of 14.2 mg/kg/min or 4 METs). The 
Captain’s results are as follows: 
DATE  SIT-UPS  PUSH-UPS RUN 
11-14-06  35 20 11:07 
05-29-07 35 25 10:25 
11-27-07  40 20 11:42 
05-27-08 35 20 12:00 
01-30-09 35 20 14:39 
06-02-09 35 20 13:10 
DISCUSSION 
Atherosclerotic Cardiovascular Disease. In 
the United States, atherosclerotic coronary ar-
tery disease (CAD) is the most common risk 
factor for cardiac arrest and sudden cardiac 
death [Meyerburg and Castellanos 2008]. Risk 
factors for its development include age over 45, 
male gender, family history of CAD, smoking, 
high blood cholesterol, high blood pressure, 
obesity/physical inactivity, and diabetes [AHA
2009]. The Captain had five of these risk fac-
tors (age over 45, male gender, family histo-
ry of CAD, high blood cholesterol, and high 
blood pressure) and severe CAD on autopsy. 
Narrowing of the coronary arteries by ath-
erosclerotic plaques occurs over many years, 
typically decades [Libby 2008]. However, the 
growth of these plaques probably occurs in a 
nonlinear, often abrupt fashion [Shah 1997]. 
Heart attacks typically occur with the sudden 
development of complete blockage (occlusion) 
in one or more coronary arteries that have not 
developed a collateral blood supply [Fuster et 
al. 1992]. This sudden blockage is primarily 
due to blood clots (thromboses) forming on top 
of atherosclerotic plaques. The Captain had an 
acute plaque rupture completely occluding his 
right coronary artery, establishing that he had 
an acute heart attack. 
Epidemiologic studies have found that heavy 
physical exertion sometimes immediately pre-
cedes and triggers the onset of acute heart at-
tacks and sudden cardiac death [Siscovick et al. 
1984; Tofler et al. 1992; Mittleman et al. 1993; 
Willich et al. 1993; Albert et al. 2000]. Heart at-
tacks in fire fighters have been associated with 
fire suppression and heavy exertion during train-
ing (including physical fitness training) [Kales 
et al. 2003; Kales et al. 2007; NIOSH 2007]. The 
Captain had run an unknown number of laps 
around the jogging track. Assuming his typical 
pace of approximately 10 minutes per mile (the 
3 
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pace required for the physical ability test), the 
Captain would have expended at least 10 METs 
in the 35 minutes he was unobserved, which is 
considered heavy physical activity [Ainsworth 
et al. 1993]. Given the Captain’s underlying 
CAD, the strenuous physical activity probably 
triggered a heart attack resulting in his sudden 
cardiac death. 
Left Ventricular Hypertrophy. The autopsy 
revealed left ventricular hypertrophy (LVH). 
LVH increases the risk for sudden cardiac 
death [Levy et al. 1990]. Hypertrophy of the 
heart’s left ventricle is a relatively common 
finding among individuals with long-standing 
high blood pressure, a heart valve problem, or 
chronic cardiac ischemia (coronary artery dis-
ease) [Siegel 1997]. The Captain’s hyperten-
sion and chronic cardiac ischemia were most 
likely responsible for his LVH. 
Occupational Medical Standards for Struc-
tural Firefighting. To reduce the risk of sud-
den cardiac arrest or other incapacitating med-
ical conditions among fire fighters, the NFPA
developed NFPA 1582, Standard on Compre-
hensive Occupational Medical Program for 
Fire Departments [NFPA 2007a]. NFPA 1582 
recommends that all fire fighters receive an-
nual medical evaluations. As part of this medi-
cal evaluation, fire fighters should receive a 
submaximal stress EKG test (85% of the fire 
fighter’s maximal heart rate) as a measure of 
aerobic capacity. For asymptomatic fire fight-
ers over age 45 (55 for women) with two or 
more risk factors for CAD (e.g., the Captain), 
NFPA 1582 recommends a cardiology evalua-
tion with a symptom limiting (maximal) imag-
sippi 
ing stress test. This recommendation is consis-
tent with the recommendation of the American 
Heart Association and the American College 
of Cardiology (AHA/ACC) [Gibbons et al. 
2002]. According to the records reviewed by 
the NIOSH investigator, neither a cardiology 
evaluation nor an imaging maximal stress test 
was recommended to the Captain by the FD 
contract clinic or the Captain’s primary care 
physician. Either may have identified his un-
derlying CAD, resulting in further evaluation 
and treatment and the likely prevention of his 
sudden cardiac death. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
The NIOSH investigator offers the following 
recommendations to address general safety and 
health issues. Had the first recommended mea-
sure been in place prior to theCaptain’s collapse, 
perhaps his underlying coronary artery disease 
could have been identified, he would have been 
referred for treatment, and his sudden cardiac 
death may have been prevented. The third rec-
ommendation may have hastened emergency 
treatment after the Captain’s collapse. 
Recommendation #1: Ensure fire fighters 
over the age of 45 with two or more risk fac-
tors for CAD have a maximal (symptom-lim-
iting) exercise stress test (EST). 
NFPA 1582, the IAFF/IAFC Fire Service Joint 
Labor Management Wellness/Fitness Initia-
tive, and the ACC/AHA recommend an exer-
cise stress test for male fire fighters older than 
45 with two or more CAD risk factors [IAFF, 
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IAFC 2008]. Although the Captain had a sub-
maximal cycle ergometer test to measure his 
aerobic capacity, this test is not the same as the 
diagnostic exercise stress test recommended 
by NFPA 1582 or the ACC/AHA [Gibbons et 
al. 2002; NFPA 2007a]. The FD contract clinic 
and/or the Captain’s primary care physician 
should have recommended a maximal EST be-
cause the Captain was over the age of 45 and 
had more than two CAD risk factors. 
Recommendation #2: Ensure that fire fighters 
are cleared for return to duty by a physician 
knowledgeable about the physical demands 
of fire fighting, the personal protective equip-
ment used by fire fighters, and the various 
components of NFPA 1582. 
Guidance regarding medical evaluations and 
examinations for structural fire fighters can be 
found in NFPA 1582 [NFPA 2007a] and in the 
IAFF/IAFC Fire Service Joint Labor Manage-
ment Wellness/Fitness Initiative [IAFF, IAFC 
2008]. According to these guidelines, the FD 
should have a physician who is officially re-
sponsible for guiding, directing, and advising 
the members with regard to their health, fit-
ness, and suitability for duty. The FD physi-
cian should review job descriptions and essen-
tial job tasks required for all FD positions and 
ranks to understand the physiological and psy-
chological demands of fire fighters and the en-
vironmental conditions under which they must 
perform. The FD physician should also be fa-
miliar with the personal protective equipment 
the fire fighter wears during various types of 
emergency operations, and the medical guid-
ance contained in NFPA 1582. If the FD does 
not have a physician on staff or on contract, 
the fire fighter’s personal physician should be 
advised of these guidelines. 
Recommendation #3: Ensure on-duty fire 
fighters exercise in pairs or within viewing 
distance of another crew member. 
Members should exercise in pairs or at least 
within viewing distance of another crew mem-
ber. If a medical emergency occurs, the other 
crew member can alert EMS or dispatch. An-
other option would be for exercising members 
to carry a PASS device and/or portable radio. 
PASS devices are portable, lightweight units 
that, when activated, emit a 95-decibel alarm. 
The device, which can be manually activated, 
automatically activates if no motion is detected 
for approximately 30 seconds [NFPA 2007b]. 
Portable radios have the advantage of allow-
ing affected members to specify the problem 
and their exact location. The disadvantages are 
that a radio is a little larger and heavier, and a 
radio will not automatically alert anyone if the 
member suddenly collapses. At the time of this 
report, the FD requires members to carry por-
table radios that have a panic button. 
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●		Severe atherosclerotic CAD 
—		Total (100%) focal narrowing of 
the right coronary artery 
—		Severe (80%) focal narrowing of 
the left anterior descending coro-
nary artery 
—		Moderate (70%) focal narrowing 
of the circumflex coronary artery 
—		Acute myocardial infarction (heart 
attack) of the posterior wall due to 
acute plaque rupture in the right 
coronary artery 
—		Evidence of a separate posterior 
wall heart attack 10–14 days prior 
to his death 
● Left ventricular hypertrophy (LVH) 
—		Left ventricular and interventricu-
lar septum walls thickened (2.0 
cm, 1.7 cm respectively); normal 
by autopsy 0.76–0.88 cm [Co-
lucci and Braunwald 1997]; nor-
mal by echocardiography 0.6–1.1 
cm [Armstrong and Feigenbaum 
2001] 
●		Normal heart size (390 grams) 
●		No evidence of a pulmonary embolus 
(blood clot in the lung arteries) 
●		Negative blood tests for drugs and alco-
hol 
●		Final pathologic diagnosis: “severe coro-
nary artery atherosclerosis with acute 
plaque change: hemorrhage into an ath-
erosclerotic plaque and rupture of the 
plaque” as the cause of death 
REFERENCES 
Armstrong WF, Feigenbaum H [2001]. Echocar-
diography. In: Braunwald E, Zipes DP, Libby 
P, eds. Heart disease: a text of cardiovascular 
medicine. 6th ed. Vol. 1. Philadelphia, PA: W.B. 
Saunders Company, p. 167. 
Colucci WS, Braunwald E [1997]. Pathophysiol-
ogy of heart failure. In: Braunwald, ed. Heart 
disease. 5th ed. Philadelphia, PA: W.B. Saunders 
Company, p. 401. 
Silver MM, Silver MD [2001]. Examination of the 
heart and of cardiovascular specimens in surgi-
cal pathology. In: Silver MD, Gotlieb AI, Schoen 
FJ, eds. Cardiovascular pathology. 3rd ed. Phila-
delphia, PA: Churchill Livingstone, pp. 8–9. 
28 2010 NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program – Selected Investigation Reports. 
2010 NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program – Selected Investigation Reports.    28







               
              
                 
                 
                    
                
               
                
                
                 
  
                  
                  
               
 
2009 Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation
	
Investigation Report • F2009–27
	
Captain Suffers Fatal Heart Attack While Participating in Fire Department Physical Fitness Program – Mississippi 
Appendix B 
Physical Ability Entrance Test 
The fire fighter candidate must pass the follow-
ing components within the time specified: 
●		35 bent knee sit-ups in less than 2 min-
utes
	
●		65-foot ladder climb without stopping 
●		50-foot rescue crawl while wearing a 50-
pound vest 
●		Run 1.5 miles in less than 13 minutes 
The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), an institute within the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention (CDC), is the federal agency responsible for conducting research and making recommen-
dations for the prevention of work-related injury and illness. In fiscal year 1998, the Congress appropriated funds 
to NIOSH to conduct a fire fighter initiative. NIOSH initiated the Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention 
Program to examine deaths of fire fighters in the line of duty so that fire departments, fire fighters, fire service orga-
nizations, safety experts and researchers could learn from these incidents. The primary goal of these investigations 
is for NIOSH to make recommendations to prevent similar occurrences. These NIOSH investigations are intended 
to reduce or prevent future fire fighter deaths and are completely separate from the rulemaking, enforcement and 
inspection activities of any other federal or state agency. Under its program, NIOSH investigators interview per-
sons with knowledge of the incident and review available records to develop a description of the conditions and 
circumstances leading to the deaths in order to provide a context for the agency’s recommendations. The NIOSH 
summary of these conditions and circumstances in its reports is not intended as a legal statement of facts. This 
summary, as well as the conclusions and recommendations made by NIOSH, should not be used for the purpose of 
litigation or the adjudication of any claim. For further information, visit the program website at 
www.cdc.gov/niosh/fire/ 
or call toll free 
1–800–CDC–INFO (1–800–232–4636) 
9 
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Lieutenant Suffers Fatal Heart Attack During Fire 
Operations – Pennsylvania 
SUMMARY 
On October 24, 2009, a 41-year-old male vol-
unteer lieutenant (LT) responded to a reported 
residential fire with possible entrapment. At 
the scene, the LT assisted in stretching a 2-inch 
hoseline and participated in extinguishing the 
fire. After about 16 minutes, the water supply 
ran low, and crews took a break. The LT com-
plained of a headache as he climbed into his en-
gine’s cab. The on-scene ambulance crew found 
the LT in the cab sweating heavily, complaining 
of tightness in his chest and shortness of breath. 
The LT became semiconscious and was helped 
to the ground and then carried to the ambulance. 
The cardiac monitor showed changes diagnostic 
of a heart attack. While en route to the hospital’s 
emergency department (ED), the LT’s condition 
worsened and, as the ambulance arrived at the 
ED, the LT suffered cardiac arrest. Cardiopulmo-
nary resuscitation (CPR) and advanced life sup-
port were begun and continued in the ED for over 
an hour until the ED physician pronounced him 
dead. The death certificate and the autopsy listed 
“severe atherosclerotic coronary artery disease 
(CAD) and hypertensive cardiomyopathy” as the 
cause of death. Given the LT’s severe underly-
ing CAD, NIOSH investigators concluded that 
the physical exertion involved in responding to 
the call, stretching the fire hose, and extinguish-
ing the fire triggered a heart attack and sudden 
cardiac death. 
NIOSH investigators offer the following recom-
mendations to address general safety and health 
issues. 
●		Provide preplacement and annual medi-
cal evaluations to all fire fighters. 
●		Perform a preplacement and an annual 
physical performance (physical ability) 
evaluation. 
●		Ensure fire fighters are cleared for return 
to duty by a physician knowledgeable 
about the physical demands of fire fight-
ing, the personal protective equipment 
used by fire fighters, and the various 
components of National Fire Protection 
Association (NFPA) 1582. 
●		Phase in a comprehensive wellness and 
fitness program for fire fighters. 
●		Provide fire fighters with medical clear-
ance to wear self-contained breathing 
apparatus (SCBA) as part of the Fire De-
partment’s medical evaluation program. 
●		Conduct annual respirator fit testing. 
30 2010 NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program – Selected Investigation Reports. 
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INTRODUCTION & METHODS 
OnOctober 24, 2009, a 41-year-old male volun-
teer LT died while fighting a structure fire. NIOSH 
was notified of this fatality on October 26, 2009, 
by the U.S. FireAdministration. NIOSH contacted 
the affected Fire Department (FD) on October 
26, 2009, to gather additional information, and on 
December 1, 2009, to initiate the investigation. 
On December 7, 2009, a safety and occupational 
health specialist from the NIOSH Fire Fighter Fa-
tality Investigation Team traveled to Pennsylvania 
to conduct an on-site investigation of the incident. 
During the investigation, NIOSH personnel 
interviewed the following people: 
● Fire Chief 
● Crew members 
● LT’s family 
NIOSH personnel reviewed the following 
documents: 
● FD training records 
● FD annual report for 2008 
● FD incident report 
● Emergency medical service (ambulance) 
incident report 
● Hospital ED records 
● Death certificate 
● Autopsy report 
● Primary care provider medical records 
● Employer medical records 
INVESTIGATIVE RESULTS 
Incident. On October 24, 2009, the FD was 
dispatched at 0013 hours to a residential struc-
ture fire with possible entrapment. The LT re-
sponded from his home to the fire station. One 
engine (staffed with a Driver/Operator, the In-
cident Commander, the LT, and a fire fighter) 
and an engine/tanker (staffed with three FD 
personnel) responded, arriving on the scene at 
0022 hours. Upon arrival the crew realized that 
the residence on fire had been abandoned for 
many years. During size-up, the Incident Com-
mander noted the roof and second floor had al-
ready collapsed into the basement and called 
for a “defensive attack.” Three personnel, in-
cluding the LT, deployed a 2-inch hose to the 
“D” side of the residence and began exterior 
fire suppression. Crew members initially wore 
full turnout gear and SCBA (not on air) but af-
ter a short time, they removed their SCBAs. 
The Chief arrived at about 0025 hours, as-
sumed command, and ordered a deck gun to 
replace the the hoseline. During this transition, 
the “B” side of the building collapsed into the 
basement. Additional FD personnel and mutual 
aid responded and arrived throughout the inci-
dent including an ambulance staffed with two 
emergency medical technicians (EMTs) and 
one paramedic. 
After approximately 16 minutes on scene (0038 
hours), both engines and the portable dump 
tank exhausted their water supplies. While the 
engine/tanker was en route to replenish its wa-
ter, crew members began taking breaks. The 
LT informed a crew member that his head hurt 
1 
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as he climbed into his engine’s cab. The crew 
member asked nearby EMTs to evaluate the 
LT. The EMTs found the LT sitting in his cab, 
wearing bunker pants, boots, and a shirt. He 
was sweating heavily and complaining of light-
headedness with some tightness in his chest. As 
a stretcher was being retrieved, the LT became 
limp. The paramedic and nearby fire fighters 
assisted the LT to the ground where, although 
his eyes were closed, he was arousable and had 
a strong radial pulse. The EMT, paramedic, and 
two fire fighters carried the LT to the stretcher 
and loaded him into the ambulance. 
Oxygen was administered as a cardiac monitor 
showed a heart rate of 110 beats per minute and 
significant ST-segment elevation (diagnostic of 
a heart attack). Two aspirin were given; two at-
tempts at starting an intravenous (IV) line were 
unsuccessful. The LT became combative, not 
allowing measurement of his blood pressure or 
administration of nitroglycerin. However, the 
EMT was able to confirm a strong, regular ra-
dial pulse. 
The ambulance departed the scene at 0047 
hours en route to the local hospital’s emer-
gency department (ED). During the transport, 
the LT sat upright and attempted to remove the 
oxygen mask, stating that he was having dif-
ficulty breathing. The crew calmed the LT and 
replaced the mask. He attempted again to re-
move the oxygen mask, and the paramedic re-
placed the mask with a nasopharyngeal airway. 
Upon nearing the hospital, the LT’s heart rate 
dropped to 38 beats per minute, and cardiac 
pacing was initiated at a rate of 70 beats per 
minute with capture. 
As the ambulance arrived at the ED (0057 
hours), the LT became unresponsive, stopped 
breathing, and was pulseless. The LTwas trans-
ferred to the ED staff who began CPR, intubated 
the LT, and placed an IV line. Cardiac resusci-
tation medications were administered, and the 
LT was shocked (defibrillated) two times with 
no change in his heart rhythm. Advanced life 
support continued without change in the LT’s 
condition until 0206 hours, when the attending 
physician pronounced the LT dead, and resus-
citation efforts stopped. 
Medical Findings. The death certificate, com-
pleted by the coroner, and the autopsy, completed 
by the forensic pathologist, listed “severe athero-
sclerotic coronary artery disease and hyperten-
sive cardiomyopathy” as the cause of death. 
Specific findings from the autopsy are listed in 
Appendix A. 
The LT was 69 inches tall and weighed 220 
pounds, giving him a body mass index (BMI) of 
32.5 kilograms per meters squared (kg/m2). A
BMI > 30.0 kilograms per meter squared is con-
sidered obese [CDC 2010]. The LT’s risk factors 
for coronary artery disease (CAD) included hy-
pertension (high blood pressure), smoking, fam-
ily history of CAD, and obesity/lack of exercise. 
He had been prescribed two antihypertensive 
medications but had not refilled the prescriptions 
for over a year. The LT had gone hunting the day 
before his death. He had no medical complaints. 
He had walked over somewhat hilly terrain for 
approximately 2 miles, expending about 9 meta-
bolic equivalents (METs), which is considered 
moderate physical activity [Ainsworth et al. 
1993; Peterson et al. 1999]. 
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DESCRIPTION OF THE FIRE DE-
PARTMENT 
At the time of the NIOSH investigation, the 
volunteer FD consisted of one fire station with 
25 uniformed personnel that served 2,000 resi-
dents in a geographic area of 30 square miles. 
In 2008, the FD responded to 55 calls including 
17 structure fires, 2 brush fires, 2 vehicle fires, 
7 motor vehicle crashes, and 27 other calls. 
Membership and Training. The FD requires 
new fire fighter applicants to be recommended 
by three currently active FD members, com-
plete an application, be 18 years of age (21 
years to drive fire apparatus), and have a valid 
State driver’s license. The applicant is voted on 
at the next general meeting. The member must 
complete the Fire Fighter Essentials course to 
fight interior structure fires. The FD also has 
a Junior Fire Fighter Program that allows the 
junior fire fighter to train and perform support 
activities until reaching the age of 18. Penn-
sylvania does not require minimum training 
levels for fire fighters. The LT was certified as 
a Fire Fighter, Driver/Operator, Wildland Fire 
Fighter, and in water rescue. He had 28 years 
of fire fighting experience. 
Preplacement and Periodic Medical Evalua-
tions. The FD does not require preplacement 
or periodic (annual) medical evaluations for 
members. No annual SCBAmedical clearance 
or annual SCBA facepiece fit test are required. 
Members injured on duty must be evaluated by 
their primary care physician, who makes the 
final determination regarding return to duty.   
Health and Wellness Programs. The FD does 
not have a formal wellness/fitness program, 
and no exercise equipment is available in the 
fire station. No annual physical ability test is 
required. 
DISCUSSION 
Atherosclerotic Coronary Artery Disease. In 
the United States, atherosclerotic CAD is the 
most common risk factor for cardiac arrest and 
sudden cardiac death [Meyerburg and Castel-
lanos 2008]. Risk factors for its development 
include age older than 45, male gender, fam-
ily history of CAD, smoking, high blood pres-
sure, high blood cholesterol, obesity/physical 
inactivity, and diabetes [AHA 2010; NHLBI 
2010]. The LT had five CAD risk factors (male 
gender, family history of CAD, smoking, hy-
pertension, and obesity/lack of exercise); the 
autopsy revealed severe CAD. 
The narrowing of the coronary arteries by ath-
erosclerotic plaques occurs over many years, 
typically decades [Libby 2008]. However, the 
growth of these plaques probably occurs in a 
nonlinear, often abrupt fashion [Shah 1997]. 
Heart attacks typically occur with the sudden 
development of complete blockage (occlusion) 
in one or more coronary arteries that have not 
developed a collateral blood supply [Fuster et 
al. 1992]. This sudden blockage is primarily 
due to blood clots (thromboses) forming on 
top of atherosclerotic plaques. 
3 
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Establishing the occurrence of a recent (acute) 
heart attack requires any of the following: char-
acteristic electrocardiogram (EKG) changes, 
elevated cardiac enzymes, or coronary artery 
thrombus. In the LT’s case, his symptoms 
(chest tightness, lightheadedness, shortness 
of breath after exertion, and sweating) were 
typical of a heart attack. In addition, the am-
bulance’s cardiac monitor revealed significant 
ST-segment elevation, a finding that confirms 
an acute heart attack. 
Epidemiologic studies have found that heavy 
physical exertion sometimes immediately pre-
cedes and triggers the onset of acute heart at-
tacks and sudden cardiac death [Siscovick et 
al. 1984; Tofler et al. 1992; Mittleman et al. 
1993; Willich et al. 1993; Albert et al. 2000]. 
Heart attacks in fire fighters have been asso-
ciated with alarm response, fire suppression, 
and heavy exertion during training (including 
physical fitness training) [Kales et al. 2003; 
Kales et al. 2007; NIOSH 2007]. The LT had 
responded to the alarm, stretched a hoseline, 
and performed fire suppression. These activi-
ties expended about 8 METs, which is consid-
ered moderate physical activity [AIHA 1971; 
Gledhill and Jamnik 1992]. Given the LT’s 
underlying CAD, the stress of performing fire 
fighting duties probably triggered his acute 
heart attack, resulting in sudden cardiac death. 
Cardiomegaly/Left Ventricular Hypertrophy.
On autopsy, the LT was found to have left ven-
tricular hypertrophy (LVH) and an enlarged 
heart. Both LVH and cardiomegaly increase 
the risk for sudden cardiac death [Levy et al. 
1990]. Hypertrophy of the heart’s left ventricle 
is a relatively common finding among indi-
viduals with long-standing high blood pres-
sure (hypertension), a heart valve problem, or 
chronic cardiac ischemia (reduced blood sup-
ply to the heart muscle) [Siegel 1997]. The LT
had a history of hypertension and CAD consis-
tent with chronic cardiac ischemia. 
Occupational Medical Standards for Structur-
al Fire Fighters. To reduce the risk of sudden 
cardiac arrest or other incapacitating medical 
conditions among fire fighters, the NFPA de-
veloped NFPA 1582, Standard on Comprehen-
sive Occupational Medical Program for Fire 
Departments [NFPA 2007a]. This voluntary in-
dustry standard provides (1) the components of 
a preplacement and annual medical evaluation 
and (2) medical fitness for duty criteria. The LT
had a history of hypertension but had not taken 
his prescription antihypertensive medication 
for over a year. 
Exercise stress tests screen people at risk for 
CAD and sudden cardiac death. NFPA 1582 
recommends performing an exercise stress test 
“as clinically indicated by history or symp-
toms” and refers the reader to Appendix A
[NFPA 2007a]. Items in Appendix A are not 
standard requirements, but are provided for 
“informational purposes only.” Appendix A
recommends using submaximal (85% of pre-
dicted heart rate) stress tests as a screening tool 
to evaluate a fire fighter’s aerobic capacity. Di-
agnostic stress tests (maximal or symptom-lim-
iting stress tests) with imaging should be used 
for fire fighters with the following conditions: 
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•		 abnormal screening submaximal tests 
•		 cardiac symptoms 
•		 known coronary artery disease 
•		 two or more risk factors for CAD (in men 
older than 45 and women older than 55) 
Risk factors are defined as hypercholester-
olemia (total cholesterol greater than 240 mil-
ligrams per deciliter [mg/dL]), hypertension 
(diastolic blood pressure greater than 90 mil-
limeters of mercury [mmHg]), smoking, dia-
betes mellitus, or family history of premature 
coronary artery disease (heart attack or sudden 
cardiac death in a first-degree relative less than 
60 years old). This exercise stress test recom-
mendation is similar to that recommended by 
the American College of Cardiology/American 
Heart Association (ACC/AHA) and the U.S. 
Department of Transportation [Gibbons et al. 
2002; Blumenthal et al. 2007]. 
Although the LT had three of the five risk fac-
tors listed above for conducting an exercise 
stress test for CAD, he was younger than the 
guidelines indicate and therefore would not 
have been tested. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
NIOSH investigators offer the following recom-
mendations to address general safety and health 
issues. 
Recommendation #1: Provide preplacement 
and annual medical evaluations to all fire fight-
ers. 
Guidance regarding the content and frequency of 
these medical evaluations can be found in NFPA
1582 and in the International Association of Fire 
Fighters (IAFF)/InternationalAssociation of Fire 
Chiefs (IAFC) Fire Service Joint Labor Manage-
ment Wellness/Fitness Initiative [NFPA 2007a; 
IAFF, IAFC 2008]. These evaluations are per-
formed to determine fire fighters’ medical ability 
to perform duties without presenting a significant 
risk to the safety and health of themselves or oth-
ers. However, the FD is not legally required to 
follow this standard or this initiative. Applying 
this recommendation involves economic reper-
cussions and may be particularly difficult for 
small volunteer fire departments to implement. 
To overcome the financial obstacle of medical 
evaluations, the FD could urge current mem-
bers to get annual medical clearances from their 
private physicians. Another option is having 
the annual medical evaluations completed by 
paramedics and emergency medical technicians 
(EMTs) from the local EMS (vital signs, height, 
weight, visual acuity, and EKG). This informa-
tion could then be provided to a community 
physician (perhaps volunteering his or her time), 
who could review the data and provide medical 
clearance (or further evaluation, if needed). The 
more extensive portions of the medical evalua-
tions could be performed by a private physician 
at the fire fighter’s expense (personal or through 
insurance), provided by a physician volunteer, or 
paid for by the FD, City, or State. Sharing the 
financial responsibility for these evaluations be-
5 
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tween fire fighters, the FD, the City, the State, 
and physician volunteers may reduce the nega-
tive financial impact on recruiting and retaining 
needed fire fighters. 
Recommendation #2: Perform a preplacement 
and an annual physical performance (physical 
ability) evaluation. 
NFPA 1500, Standard on Fire Department Oc-
cupational Safety and Health Program, requires 
the FD to develop physical performance require-
ments for candidates and members who engage 
in emergency operations [NFPA 2007b]. Mem-
bers who engage in emergency operations must 
be annually qualified (physical ability test) as 
meeting these physical performance standards 
for structural fire fighters [NFPA 2007b]. 
Recommendation #3: Ensure that fire fighters 
are cleared for return to duty by a physician 
knowledgeable about the physical demands of 
fire fighting, the personal protective equipment 
used by fire fighters, and the various compo-
nents of NFPA 1582. 
Guidance regarding medical evaluations and 
examinations for structural fire fighters can be 
found in NFPA 1582 [NFPA 2007a] and in the 
IAFF/IAFC Fire Service Joint Labor Manage-
ment Wellness/Fitness Initiative [IAFF, IAFC 
2008]. According to these guidelines, the FD 
should have an officially designated physician 
who is responsible for guiding, directing, and 
advising the members with regard to their health, 
fitness, and suitability for duty. The physician 
should review job descriptions and essential job 
tasks required for all FD positions and ranks to 
understand the physiological and psychological 
demands of fire fighters and the environmental 
conditions under which they must perform, as 
well as the personal protective equipment they 
must wear during various types of emergency 
operations. This recommendation is based on 
review of the FD health and medical programs. 
The LT’s primary care physician had treated the 
LT for hypertension and back pain since 2003. 
Whether the LT’s physician was aware that his 
patient was a fire fighter is unclear, and neither 
his medical nor his FD records mentioned medi-
cal clearance for duty. 
Recommendation #4: Phase in a comprehen-
sive wellness and fitness program for fire fight-
ers. 
Guidance for fire department wellness/fitness 
programs to reduce risk factors for cardiovascular 
disease and improve cardiovascular capacity is 
found in NFPA 1583, Standard on Health-Relat-
ed Fitness Programs for Fire Fighters, the IAFF/ 
IAFC Fire Service Joint Labor Management 
Wellness/Fitness Initiative, and the National Vol-
unteer Fire Council (NVFC) Health and Well-
ness Guide, and in Firefighter Fitness: A Health 
and Wellness Guide [USFA 2004; IAFF, IAFC 
2008; NFPA 2008; Schneider 2010]. Worksite 
health promotion programs have been shown to 
be cost effective by increasing productivity, re-
ducing absenteeism, and reducing the number of 
work-related injuries and lost work days [Stein 
et al. 2000; Aldana 2001]. Fire service health 
promotion programs have been shown to reduce 
coronary artery disease risk factors and improve 
fitness levels, with mandatory programs showing 
themostbenefit [Dempseyet al. 2002;Womacket 
36 2010 NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program – Selected Investigation Reports. 
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al. 2005; Blevins et al. 2006]. A study conducted 
by the Oregon Health and Science University re-
ported a savings of more than $1 million for each 
of four large fire departments implementing the 
IAFF/IAFC wellness/fitness program compared 
to four large fire departments not implementing 
a program. These savings were primarily due to 
a reduction of occupational injury/illness claims 
with additional savings expected from reduced 
future nonoccupational healthcare costs [Kuehl 
2007]. 
Given the FD’s structure, the NVFC program 
might be the most appropriate model [USFA
2004]. NIOSH recommends a formal, structured 
wellness/fitness program to ensure all members 
receive the benefits of a health promotion pro-
gram. 
Recommendation #5: Provide fire fighters with 
medical clearance to wear SCBA as part of the 
Fire Department’s medical evaluation pro-
gram. 
The Occupational Safety and Health Adminis-
tration (OSHA) Revised Respiratory Protection 
Standard requires employers to provide medical 
evaluations and clearance for employees using 
respiratory protection [29 CFR 1910.134]. These 
clearance evaluations are required for private in-
dustry employees and public employees in States 
operating OSHA-approved State plans [OSHA
2009]. Pennsylvania does not operate an OSHA-
approved State plan nor other State-regulated 
workplace safety and health program. However, 
we recommend voluntary compliance with this 
standard to ensure all members have been medi-
cally cleared to wear an SCBA. 
Recommendation #6: Conduct annual respira-
tor fit testing. 
The OSHA respiratory protection standard re-
quires employers whose employees are required 
to use a respirator (e.g., an SCBA) to have a 
formal respiratory protection program, includ-
ing annual fit testing [29 CFR 1910.134]. As 
mentioned previously, Pennsylvania is not an 
OSHA-approved State plan; therefore, the FD is 
not required to follow OSHA standards [OSHA
2010]. 
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APPENDIX A - Autopsy Findings 
 Severe atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease 
o	 Severe (80%) focal narrowing of the left anterior descending coronary artery
o	 Moderate (70%) focal narrowing of the left circumflex coronary artery
o	 Moderate (50%) focal narrowing of the right coronary artery
o	 No evidence of recent thrombus (blood clot in the coronary arteries) 
 Hypertensive cardiomyopathy 
o	 Cardiomegaly (enlarged heart) (heart weighed 520 grams [g]; predicted normal weight is 
between 296 g and 516 g as a function of sex, age, and body weight) [Silver and Silver 
2001] 
o	 Left ventricular hypertrophy (LVH) 
Left ventricular wall and interventricular septum thickened (2.0 centimeters [cm] and 1.8  
cm respectively;
x normal by autopsy 0.76–0.88 cm [Colucci and Braunwald 1997]; 
x normal by echocardiography 0.6–1.1 cm [Armstrong and Feigenbaum 2001] 
Microscopic evidence of myocyte hypertrophy, myocyte disarray, and interstitial fibrosis 
 Normal cardiac valves
 No evidence of a pulmonary embolus (blood clot in the lung arteries) 
   Carboxyhemoglobin (blood test for carbon monoxide exposure) 4.6% (normal for smokers; 
toxic level is 15% – 35% saturation [Winek 1976]) 
 Negative blood tests for drugs and alcohol 
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The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), an institute within the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention (CDC), is the federal agency responsible for conducting research and making recommen-
dations for the prevention of work-related injury and illness. In fiscal year 1998, the Congress appropriated funds 
to NIOSH to conduct a fire fighter initiative. NIOSH initiated the Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention 
Program to examine deaths of fire fighters in the line of duty so that fire departments, fire fighters, fire service orga-
nizations, safety experts and researchers could learn from these incidents. The primary goal of these investigations 
is for NIOSH to make recommendations to prevent similar occurrences. These NIOSH investigations are intended 
to reduce or prevent future fire fighter deaths and are completely separate from the rulemaking, enforcement and 
inspection activities of any other federal or state agency. Under its program, NIOSH investigators interview per-
sons with knowledge of the incident and review available records to develop a description of the conditions and 
circumstances leading to the deaths in order to provide a context for the agency’s recommendations. The NIOSH 
summary of these conditions and circumstances in its reports is not intended as a legal statement of facts. This 
summary, as well as the conclusions and recommendations made by NIOSH, should not be used for the purpose of 
litigation or the adjudication of any claim. For further information, visit the program website at 
www.cdc.gov/niosh/fire/ 
or call toll free 
1–800–CDC–INFO (1–800–232–4636) 
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A summary of a NIOSH fire fighter fatality investigation June 11, 2009 
Volunteer Fire Fighter Dies While Lost in Residential Structure Fire-
Alabama 
Incident Scene after Victim Removed 
(Photo courtesy of sheriff’s office) 
SUMMARY 
On October 29, 2008, a 24-year old male volunteer fire fighter (the victim) was fatally injured while 
fighting a residential structure fire. The victim, one of three fire fighters on scene, entered the 
The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), an institute within the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC), is the federal agency responsible for conducting research and making
recommendations for the prevention of work-related injury and illness. In fiscal year 1998, the Congress appropriated
funds to NIOSH to conduct a fire fighter initiative. NIOSH initiated the Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and
Prevention Program to examine deaths of fire fighters in the line of duty so that fire departments, fire fighters, fire
service organizations, safety experts and researchers could learn from these incidents. The primary goal of these 
investigations is for NIOSH to make recommendations to prevent similar occurrences. These NIOSH investigations
are intended to reduce or prevent future fire fighter deaths and are completely separate from the rulemaking,
enforcement and inspection activities of any other federal or state agency. Under its program, NIOSH investigators
interview persons with knowledge of the incident and review available records to develop a description of the
conditions and circumstances leading to the deaths in order to provide a context for the agency’s recommendations.
The NIOSH summary of these conditions and circumstances in its reports is not intended as a legal statement of facts.
This summary, as well as the conclusions and recommendations made by NIOSH, should not be used for the purpose
of litigation or the adjudication of any claim. For further information, visit the program website at
www.cdc.gov/niosh/fire or call toll free at 1-800-CDC-INFO (1-800-232-4643).
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residential structure by himself through a carport door with a partially charged 1½-in hose line; he 
became lost in thick black smoke.  The victim radioed individuals on the fireground to get him out. 
Fire fighters were unable to locate the victim after he entered the structure which became engulfed in 
flames. The victim was caught in a flashover and was unable to escape the fire. Approximately an 
hour after the victim entered the structure alone, a police officer looking through the kitchen window 
noticed the victim’s hand resting on a kitchen counter; the victim was nine feet from the carport door 
he had entered. The victim was removed from the structure and pronounced dead at the scene by 
emergency medical services.  Key contributing factors identified in this investigation include: fire
fighters entering a structure fire without adequate training, insufficient manpower, and lack of an 
established incident command system. 
NIOSH investigators concluded that, to minimize the risk of similar occurrences, fire departments 
should: 
•	 ensure that fire fighters receive essential training consistent with national consensus
standards on structural fire fighting before being allowed to operate at a fire incident




•	 ensure that fire fighters are trained to follow the two-in/two-out rule and maintain crew 
integrity at all times
•	 ensure that adequate numbers of apparatus and fire fighters are on scene before initiating
an offensive fire attack in a structure fire 
•	 ensure that officers and fire fighters know how to evaluate risk versus gain and perform a 
thorough scene size-up before initiating interior strategies and tactics
•	 develop, implement, and enforce a written incident management system to be followed at all 
emergency incident operations and ensure that officers and fire fighters are trained on how 
to implement the incident management system
•	 ensure fire fighters are trained in essential self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) and 
emergency survival skills 
•	 ensure that protocols are developed on issuing a Mayday so that fire fighters and dispatch 
centers know how to respond 
•	 ensure that a properly trained incident safety officer (ISO) is established at structure fires
•	 ensure that a rapid intervention team (RIT) is established and available at structure fires 
44 2010 NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program – Selected Investigation Reports. 
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•	 ensure that properly coordinated ventilation is conducted on structure fires 
•	 ensure that driver/pump operators receive adequate training to operate and maintain a 
water supply to hoselines on the fireground 
•	 ensure that all fire fighters engaged in fireground activities wear the full array of  personal 
protective equipment (PPE) issued to them 
•	 ensure that fire fighters are trained to react to PASS and SCBA low air alarms, and that 
procedures are developed to properly shut down and secure a SCBA and its PASS device 
Additionally, states, municipalities, and authorities having jurisdiction 
•	 should consider requiring mandatory training for fire fighters 
INTRODUCTION 
On October 29, 2008, a 24-year-old male volunteer fire fighter (the victim) died in a residential 
structure fire. On October 30, 2008, the U.S. Fire Administration notified the National Institute for 
Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) of this incident.  On November 3-7, 2008, two safety and 
occupational health specialists from the NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention 
Program investigated this incident.  The NIOSH investigators interviewed the officers and fire
fighters of the volunteer departments involved in this incident and county EMS responders.  The 
investigators also spoke with representatives from the Alabama State Fire College and the Alabama 
Association of Volunteer Fire Departments. The investigators met with the Deputy State Fire
Marshal, sheriff’s office investigator and the County 911 Dispatch Director.  NIOSH investigators
also reviewed witness statements and photographs of the fireground and dispatch tapes, the victim’s 
training records, and the coroner’s cause of death notification. The incident site was visited and 
photographed. 
Although the performance of the victim’s SCBA was not considered a factor in this incident, the 
SCBA was examined by NIOSH’s National Personal Protective Technology Laboratory to determine 
conformity to the NIOSH approved configuration. When finalized, a summary of this evaluation will
be added as an appendix to this report.  At the request of the fire department, NIOSH contracted with 
a personal protective equipment (PPE) expert to evaluate the victim’s PPE.a The expert evaluation 
concluded that the PPE was extensively damaged due to flame and heat exposures, most of which 
likely occurred after the victim succumbed to either smoke inhalation or severe burn injuries.  It was 
a The PPE evaluation report is available upon request to the NIOSH Division of Safety Research, Fire Fighter Fatality
Investigation and Prevention Program (Attention: Tim Merinar), 1095 Willowdale Road, MS H1808, Morgantown, WV,
26505, 304-285-5916, Tmerinar@cdc.gov.
5 
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not possible to identify if any of the PPE damage preceded the fatality, or if improper wearing of the 
PPE contributed to the ultimately fatal injuries. Where it was possible to identify the manufacturer,
style of product, and manufacturing date, the gear appeared to be relatively new and compliant with 
the latest editions of relevant standards.  The expert noted that no protective clothing or equipment 
would be expected to provide adequate protection in the circumstances of this event in which the
victim was possibly exposed to a flashover event and subject to flame and high heat for nearly an 
hour. 
FIRE DEPARTMENTS
•	 Station “Alpha” – Victim’s Department. The victim’s volunteer department has one station 
and is comprised of 21 fire fighters. The department serves a population of approximately 
14,000 in a geographical area of 25 square miles. 
•	 Station “Bravo” – Mutual Aid Department. The volunteer department has one station and is 
comprised of 20 fire fighters.  The department serves a rural population in a geographical area 
of 28 square miles.
•	 Station “Charlie” – Mutual Aid Department. The volunteer department has one station and 
is comprised of 18 fire fighters. The department serves a population of approximately 8,000 
in an area of about 47 square miles.  Note: Bravo Fire Department was dispatched before 
Charlie Fire Department, but did not respond until after the victim was located. 
The victim’s department had no verbal or written standard operating procedures for their members to 
follow. 
TRAINING and EXPERIENCE
The 24 year-old victim had been a volunteer fire fighter with this department for 2 years. The victim 
had attended documented peer-led training on self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA), pump 
operations, water tactics, and general firefighting.  The victim had also completed various online 
training courses on the incident command system (ICS) and national incident management system 
(NIMS). 
The fire fighter initially operating with the victim had joined the fire department three months prior to 
the incident with no previous experience. Other fire fighters on scene had completed the same online
courses in ICS and NIMS. 
Alabama has no state training requirements for volunteer fire fighters. The Alabama State Fire
College has a non-mandatory 160-hour volunteer fire fighter certification course.1, 2 Alpha fire 
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department members on scene had not completed this training.  The three responding members from 
Charlie fire department had taken this training. 
EQUIPMENT and PERSONNEL 
•	 Station “Alpha” - Victim’s Department 
Alpha Rescue 1 (AR1) with one fire fighter (fire fighter #1) 

Alpha Engine 2 (AE2) with two fire fighters (victim, fire fighter #2)  

Alpha Truck 2 (AT2) with one fire fighter (fire fighter #3) 

Alpha Engine 1 (AE1) with one fire fighter (fire fighter #4) 

•	 Station “Charlie” - Mutual Aid Department 
Charlie Engine 3 (CE3) with fire chief (CFC) and one fire fighter (fire fighter #5) 

Charlie Engine 1 (CE1) with one fire fighter (fire fighter #6) 

Privately Owned Vehicle (POV) with one fire fighter 

•	 Water Supply on scene included:
	
AR1 300 gallons (used after last communication with victim) 

AE1 1,000 gallons (arrived after last communication with victim) 

AE2 1,000 gallons 

AT2 1,200 gallons (not used) 

CE1 1,000 gallons (arrived after last communication with victim) 

CE3 3,000 gallons (arrived after last communication with victim) 

TIMELINE 
The timeline for this incident includes the initial call to the 911 dispatch center at 1301 hours.  Only 
the units directly involved in the operations preceding the incident are discussed in this report. 
Certain key radio transmissions are summarized in the timeline.  All times are approximate.  The
response, listed in order of arrival, fire conditions and key events, includes: 
•	 1301 Hours
911 dispatch center receives a cellular 911 call for an attic fire in a house with all occupants 
out 
Alpha Fire Department dispatched 
•	 1310 Hours 
AR1 en route 
7 
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• 1316 Hours (thick black smoke from roof)
AR1 on scene and states, “smoke coming from roof” 

AR1 driver requests Bravo Fire Department to be dispatched 

Bravo Fire Department dispatched 

• 1317 Hours 
AE2, operated by the victim, on scene (no en route time available) 

County EMS dispatched 

• 1318 Hours 
Bravo Fire Department dispatched again after no response 

County EMS en route 

Victim possibly requesting his hoseline to be charged 

• 1319 Hours 
AE1 en route 

FF1 advises victim he is charging his line 

• 1320 Hours 
Sounds like victim states, “…fire getting away in here…” 
• 1323 Hours 
Charlie Fire Department dispatched after Bravo Fire Department was dispatched twice 
with no response 
Inaudible radio traffic by victim
• 1324 Hours 
Sounds like victim yells “I’m hot…Come get me, come get me!”
• 1328 Hours (fire blowing out “A” side windows, front door, and carport entry) 
AT2 on scene (no en route time available)
	
AE1 on scene 

• 1330 Hours 
CE1 and CE3 en route 

County EMS on scene 

• 1333 Hours 
AR1 requested ambulance 
911 dispatch center advised AR1 that ambulance may be on scene 
AR1 requests second ambulance to be dispatched 
911 dispatch center requested reason for a second ambulance, with no response 
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• 1338 Hours (fire visible from doors and “A” and “B” side windows) 
CE3 on scene 
• 1339 Hours 
CE1 on scene 
• 1356 Hours 
AR1 requested local power company to be contacted 
• 1418 Hours 
911 dispatch center received cellular 911 call from police officer on scene requesting Bravo 
and Delta Fire Departments be dispatched to the scene to help with a trapped fire fighter 
• 1420 Hours 
Victim found and removed from structure
PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT 
The victim was last seen wearing a full array of personal protective clothing and equipment, 
consisting of turnout gear (coat and pants), helmet, Nomex® hood, gloves, boots, and a self-
contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) with an integrated personal alert safety system (PASS).  The 
structural fire fighting gear was compliant with the 2007 edition of NFPA 1971.  The victim was 
equipped with a portable radio, flashlight, and various fire fighter hand tools in his pockets.  The heat 
resistant outer shell, moisture barrier, and insulating thermal lining were all present during the 
incident and documented during the investigation. The victim was found without his helmet and 
Nomex® hood on.  The victim was also missing a glove, boot, and assigned radio.  The face piece 
appeared to have been melted off of the victim. 
STRUCTURE
The incident structure was a single-story brick ranch house built in 1969. The residential structure 
had approximately 2,100 square feet of furnished living area and no basement. The interior
construction consisted of wood framing and possibly drywall. The exterior construction was brick 
with an attached carport at the “A-D” corner (see Diagram). A tin roof had been placed overtop the 
existing shingled roof. 
The origin and cause of the fire was ruled accidental by the Deputy State Fire Marshal and believed 
to have started in the chimney. The fireplace had been converted into a wood stove with a flue in or
around 1970 or 1971. Approximately 8-10 years prior to the incident, the brick chimney had begun 
to pull away from the house.  The owner had wrapped a steel cable around the chimney and placed a 
9 
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turnbuckle to connect the cable ends; this supported the chimney while pulling it back against the 
house (see Photo 1).
Photo 1. Steel cable used to support the chimney against the house with a turnbuckle. 
(Photos courtesy of sheriff’s office) 
After the chimney was repositioned, the owner noticed that bricks from the chimney’s flue had
cracked and shifted. The owner removed the damaged bricks and replaced them with hollow cinder 
blocks. These blocks had been laid with the hollows horizontally positioned towards the attic space 
(see Photo 2). The residents of the house were safely evacuated prior to the fire department’s arrival. 
The structure was completely destroyed by a rekindle several days later. 
Photo 2.  The picture shows the area of the brick chimney flue that was replaced with cinder
blocks. The cinder blocks allowed heat and flame to impinge on the exterior wall allowing fire
to spread into the attic space. 
(Photo courtesy of sheriff’s office) 
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WEATHER
The weather at the time of the incident was clear with a temperature of 55°F and slight winds from 
the west. 
INVESTIGATION
On October 29, 2008, at 1301 hours, the 911 dispatch center received a cellular 911 call for an attic 
fire. The initial dispatch included Station Alpha at 1301 hours, Station Bravo at 1316 hours (no 
response), and Station Charlie at 1323 hours.  Smoke was showing from the roof upon arrival of 
Station Alpha’s first unit. Incident command was not established by arriving units. 
Initial activities of AR1 and AE2 
AR1 marked on scene at 1316 hours with thick, black smoke showing from the roof. Fire fighter #1 
(FF1) exited the apparatus after he had positioned it in the street in front of the house. He then spoke 
to several individuals in the yard that had appeared to be exiting away from the house.  A female 
advised him that there was no one left in the house.  At 1317 hours the victim and fire fighter #2 
(FF2) marked on scene in AE2 and positioned their apparatus behind AR1 (see Diagram).  FF1 met
the victim and FF2 between their apparatus to put gear on. The victim and FF2 then walked around 
the house to check on fire conditions.  FF1 then flaked out cross-lay #1 (200-ft of 1½-in hose) from 
AE2. FF2 returned to AE2 to retrieve the hoseline while the victim waited at the A-D corner under
the carport. It is believed that the victim and FF2 were on air.  FF2 pulled the uncharged cross-lay #1 
to the carport door and handed the nozzle to the victim, while FF1 charged the line.  The victim
opened the bail and water trickled out of the nozzle.  The victim yelled back to FF1 to give him more 
pressure on the hoseline. FF2 recalls hearing the engine of AE2 get really loud, but could not 
confirm the line being fully charged.  The victim and FF2, on air, walked into the structure through 
the carport door. They were approximately two feet inside the structure and were met by thick, 
rolling black smoke, but no fire. Quickly, they exited through the carport door taking cross-lay #1 
with them.  The victim told FF2 to go and get a flashlight. FF2 reported that he told the victim to
wait for his return, and that the victim indicated that he would wait. 
Activities of FF2 
FF2 reported that he walked to the end of the driveway (approximately 75-ft) grabbed the flashlight 
off of the apparatus, and returned to the carport door. The victim was no longer under the carport,
thick black smoke was rolling from the door, and cross-lay #1 was stretched into the structure (see
Photo 3). FF2, still on air, entered back into the house through the carport door but could not see his 
hands or feet just inside the door. He turned the flashlight on and still could not see anything but 
rolling black smoke. He started yelling the victim’s name and listening for the sound of water 
flowing or a PASS device. He heard nothing before his low air alarm sounded. Note: FF1 stated his 
low air alarm sounded after 15-20 minutes of being on air. 
1 
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Photo 3. Door under carport that victim entered through. 
(Photo courtesy of sheriff’s office) 
Activities of FF1 
Moments after FF2 left with the flashlight, FF1 reported hearing the victim radio him and stating, 
“…at front door, can’t get it opened.” Note: This was not heard on the 911 dispatch tape by NIOSH 
investigators and is believed to have been on a non-recorded fire department talk around channel. 
FF1 retrieved an axe from AE2 and donned his SCBA over his bunker gear. He ran to the front porch 
and found the screen and exterior doors locked.  He yanked the screen door off the frame and 
punched the exterior door open with the head of the axe.  He was met with thick black smoke causing 
him to step back and clean the soot from his face piece.  He then stood in the doorway yelling for the 
victim. FF1 then heard glass breaking from the bay window beside the front door.  This window was 
between the front door and carport (see Photo 4). 
Photo 4. Incident scene after rekindle and collapse showing the front door and bay window. 
(NIOSH photo) 
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FF1 thought it was the victim trying to get out.  He used the axe and removed the rest of the window 
pane from the frame. He yelled for the victim again from this window with no response.  He then 
walked off the porch to the carport to see if the victim had come out of the house.  He then ran down 
the D-side to the C-side of the house to look for a back door. During this exterior search, the victim 
radioed FF1 again, “get me out!” With no available access from C-side, FF1 ran back to the A-side 
of the house and was met by FF2.   
Activities of FF1 and FF2 
They both spoke briefly about the victim being lost inside the house.  FF2 asked FF1 to assist him in 
changing his air bottle. After getting his bottle changed, FF2 attempted to get cross-lay #2 (200-ft of 
1½-in hose) off AE2 when he noticed the house was “engulfed” in flames. Note: Fire was believed 
to be pushing out the carport door and A-side bay window. FF1 radioed the 911 dispatch center and 
requested a second ambulance. Note: The first ambulance was dispatched to check on the occupants 
of the house and was available on scene.  The dispatcher asked him why he needed a second 
ambulance, but never got a response.  FF1 noticed that cross-lay #1 was flat so he shut the line down, 
disconnected the section of hose closest to the carport not exposed to flames, and retrieved a nozzle 
from the arriving AT2 with fire fighter #3 (FF3).  Note: This was the same line that the victim had
taken into the house. During the fire investigation it was discovered that the hoseline was burnt 
through at the carport threshold. FF1 then assisted FF2 in flaking out cross-lay #2 to the house. FF1 
saw that AE1 had arrived with fire fighter #4 (FF4).  He told FF4 about the victim missing in the 
structure and the inability to get him out.  After cross-lay #1 was disconnected from the burnt section 
of hose and a new nozzle connected, it was placed back in service. FF1 took cross-lay #1 and 
sprayed water on the front porch until AE2 ran out of water. When AE2 ran out of water, FF1 
dropped cross-lay #1 in the front yard and drove AE1 a ½ mile down the road to a hydrant to fill up.  
Arriving apparatus from Charlie Fire Department then supplied AE2. 
Activities of AT2 and AE1 
AT2 and AE1 marked on scene at 1328 hours with fire blowing out the windows on the A-side, front 
door and carport entry. FF4 set AE1 to pump and supplied their 1,000 gallons of water to AE2 via a 
2½-in supply line. AT2 did not supply or receive any water to or from apparatus on scene. No 
hoselines were stretched from AT2 or AE1.  FF4 monitored the pump panels of AE1 and AE2 while 
FF3 briefly assisted FF2 with charging cross-lay #2. FF3 then picked up cross-lay #1 and took it 
with him as he entered the structure briefly via the front door. He briefly sprayed water as he yelled 
for the victim; he heard neither a response nor a sounding PASS device. He was quickly pushed back 
through the front door by intense heat and fire. FF3 made a second entry through the front door to 
locate the victim with no success.
Activities of CE1 and CE3 
CE3 marked on scene at 1338 hours with their fire chief (CFC) and fire fighter #5 (FF5); the CFC 
stated the house was “heavily involved” with fire. The fire had not vented through the roof, but was 
visible from A-side and B-side window and door openings. AE1 advised the CFC that he was going 
to get water. FF5 took a 2½-in supply line from CE3 and supplied AE2 with its’ 3,000 gallons of 
3 
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water. FF5 operated the pump panel on CE3 with assistance from the CFC. The CFC pulled one
preconnected 150-ft 1¾-in hoseline to the front yard and one 100-ft 1¾-in hoseline to the A-D corner. 
CE1 marked on scene at 1339 hours with fire fighter #6 (FF6).  FF6 exited his apparatus and briefly 
spoke to FF4 about what was going on. FF6 then picked up what is believed to have been cross-lay 
#2 that was placed on the ground and not in use. He stated the line had too much pressure on it for 
him to handle and that he did not see anyone operating the pump panel on AE2 to fix it. Note: When
interviewed, one pump operator stated the department did not have a set pump discharge pressure 
for different or multiple lines run from an apparatus.  A pump operator would adjust the pressure 
according to fire fighters operating the hand line. He also noticed a 1-in booster line from AR1 in
use by Alpha Fire Department members on the A-side. The CFC took the 2½-in supply line from 
CE1 and hooked it into CE3. The CFC then operated a hoseline at the A-D corner while FF6 
operated a hand line at the A-B corner (not clear which apparatus the line was pulled from). A third
fire fighter from Charlie Fire Department arrived on scene in his (POV) and assisted a fire fighter 
with flowing water into the A-side bay window. The fire fighters on CE1 and CE3 were unable to 
make an interior attack or get close to the burning house because they had responded to the incident 
without their structural fire fighting gear. Note: All Charlie Fire Department members on scene of 
this incident responded without structural firefighting gear. Their gear had been taken to their 
residences in case they responded to incidents from home, instead of responding to the fire station to 
pick up an apparatus. This was a common practice by the Fire Chief and his members.  When CE1 
and CE3 tank water ran out, FF6 and CFC left in CE1 and CE3 to find the hydrant ½ mile down the 
road. When they returned, the victim was being removed from the structure.  By this time, AE1 had 
returned and was positioned at the B-C corner and AE1 was again, out of water.
Victim Discovery 
Individual responders interviewed by NIOSH remarked on several air packs taken off by fire fighters 
and left unattended on the fireground. These air packs were left on and the activated integrated PASS 
devices continued to alarm. This may have hindered the efforts of fire fighters to locate the victim
during rescue efforts because they could not determine whether the PASS alarm was coming from
inside or outside the structure. A town police officer who had been on scene since the initial dispatch
was assisting fire fighters in trying to locate the victim from the exterior. FF4 came upon a burnt 
glove on the ground in front of the C-side kitchen window. The police officer grabbed an extension 
ladder and placed it against the window sill of the kitchen window.  The police officer stated the fire 
had burned itself out in this area and the smoke was light enough to get a good view inside the house. 
He noticed the victim’s hand resting on the kitchen counter under some debris.  He immediately 
alerted fire fighters who were close by.  Two fire fighters entered through the carport door, into the 
laundry room and turned left into the kitchen where they saw the police officer in the window. The 
victim was found on the kitchen floor in front of the kitchen sink; he was removed from the house 
and pronounced dead on the scene by County EMS responders at 1420 hours. A nozzle connected to 
the original cross-lay #1, the victim’s radio, helmet, face piece, SCBA, and a boot were found 
scattered around him (see Photo 5). It appeared that the helmet, face piece, and SCBA were burned 
off of the victim.  The nozzle was found with the bale fully opened at a 30 degree fog setting.   
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1. Victim – 112” from carport door
2. SCBA – 85” from carport door
3. Face Piece – 128” from carport door
4. Helmet – 139 ½” from carport door
5. Radio – 147” from carport door
6. Boot – 94” from carport door
7. Nozzle – 101” from carport door
Photo 5. Number cues placed to document victim and items discovered. 
(Photo courtesy of sheriff’s office) 
Fire Behavior and Spread 
During their investigation, the fire marshal and sheriff’s office investigators believed that the 
chimney flue failed allowing radiant heat and flame to travel through the open sides of the cinder 
blocks and impinge on combustible materials in the attic. It is believed that the fire smoldered for a 
while in the attic before finding a reliable fuel source.  Fire burned across the C-side of the structure’s 
attic before burning down into the living area where the wood stove was located (see Photo 6). Thick 
black smoke was filling the structure when the victim and FF2 entered through the carport for the
first time. No flames were immediately visible according to FF2. FF1 was met with the same smoke
conditions when he opened the front door and the bay window broke under extreme heat conditions.
Flames throughout the house erupted moments later. FF1 and FF2 do not recall any type of 
explosion or “puffs” of smoke before the house erupted in flames.  The sheriff’s office investigator 
believed that the house “flashed,” trapping the victim and exposing him to extreme heat and fire
conditions after the door and window were opened, which would have allowed fresh air (oxygen) to 
join the fuel mixture (heavy dark smoke) inside, ultimately leading to the flashover.
5 
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Photo 6. Fire damage to living room area before rekindle and structural collapse.
(Photo courtesy of sheriff’s office) 
CONTRIBUTING FACTORS
Occupational injuries and fatalities are often the result of one or more contributing factors or key 
events in a larger sequence of events that ultimately result in the injury or fatality. NIOSH 
investigators identified the following items as key contributing factors in this incident that ultimately 
led to the fatality:
•	 Fire fighters operating on a fireground and entering a burning structure without adequate 
training. 
•	 Insufficient manpower to combat the fire.
•	 No incident command system established. 
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CAUSE OF DEATH 
According to the county medical examiner’s office, the victim died from smoke inhalation and 
thermal burns.  The victim’s carboxyhemoglobin (COHb) was 35%.
RECOMMENDATIONS 
Recommendation #1: Fire departments should ensure that fire fighters receive essential training 
consistent with national consensus standards on structural fire fighting before being allowed to 
operate at a fire incident. 
Discussion: Training on structural fire fighting is essential for fire fighter safety and survival. This 
training should include, but not be limited to, departmental standard operating procedures, fire fighter 
safety, building construction, fire behavior, and fireground tactics. NFPA 1001 Standard for Fire
Fighter Professional Qualifications was established to facilitate the development of nationally
applicable performance standards for fire service personnel.3 NFPA 1500 Fire Department 
Occupational Safety and Health Program, Chapter 5, requires that the fire department provide an 
annual skills check to verify minimum professional qualifications of its members.4 The purpose of 
NFPA 1001 Standard for Fire Fighter Professional Qualifications is to show clear and concise 
requirements that can be used to determine that an individual, when measured to the standard, 
possesses the knowledge, skills, and abilities to perform as a fire fighter and that these requirements 
can be used by any fire department in the country. Once the basic skills and knowledge sets of Fire 
Fighter I are met the individual can continue on to Fire Fighter II. Staying proficient at these levels is
only possible through a training regime developed by the fire department or training entity that covers
topics like ventilation, hazard recognition, fire behavior, incident command system, scene size-up, 
and basic water operations. 
The state of Alabama does offer a non-mandatory 160 hour volunteer fire fighter certification course. 
This course is optional and not required to be a volunteer fire fighter in the state of Alabama. Neither
the victim nor fire fighters from his department on scene had completed this training. During 
interviews, the fire chief advised NIOSH investigators that the victim and two other fire fighters were 
scheduled to start this training in January 2009. The chief currently has nine fire fighters in the 160 
hour certification program that are scheduled to graduate in June 2009.  This basic training provides 
fire fighters with the knowledge, skills, and abilities to make sound, safe decisions before engaging in 
active fire suppression. Fire departments should pair untrained and inexperienced fire fighters with a 
trained and experienced fire fighter. 
Recommendation #2: Fire departments should develop, implement, and enforce written standard 
operating procedures (SOPs) for fireground operations. 
Discussion: Written SOPs enable individual fire department members an opportunity to read and 
7 
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maintain a level of assumed understanding of operational procedures. Conversely, fire departments 
can suffer when there is an absence of well developed SOPs. The NIOSH Alert, Preventing Injuries
and Deaths of Fire Fighters identifies the need to establish and follow fire fighting policies and
procedures.5 Guidelines and procedures should be developed, fully implemented and enforced to be 
effective. The following NFPA Standards also identify the need for written documentation to guide
fire fighting operations:
NFPA 1500 Fire Department Occupational Safety and Health Program states that fire departments 
shall prepare and maintain policies and standard operating procedures that document the 
organizational structure, membership, roles and responsibilities, expected functions, and training 
requirements, including the following….(4) The procedures that will be employed to initiate and 
manage operations at the scene of an emergency incident.4 
NFPA 1561 Standard on Emergency Services Incident Management System states that standard 
operating procedures (SOPs) shall include the requirements for implementation of the incident 
management system and shall describe the options that are available for application according to the
needs of each particular situation.6 
NFPA 1720 Standard for the Organization and Deployment of Fire Suppression Operations, 
Emergency Medical Operations, and Special Operations to the Public by Volunteer Fire 
Departments states that the authority having jurisdiction shall promulgate the fire department’s 
organizational, operational, and deployment procedures by issuing written administrative regulations, 
standard operating procedures, and departmental orders.7 
The victim’s fire department had not implemented any verbal or written SOPs for their members. An 
effective SOP can aid in the decision making process when on the fireground. 
Recommendation #3: Fire departments should ensure that fire fighters are trained to follow the 
two-in/two-out rule and maintain crew integrity at all times.
Discussion: NFPA 1500 Fire Department Occupational Safety and Health Program states that the
two-in/two-out rule should be used when making entry into a hazardous area.4 The team members
should be in communication with each other through visual, audible, or electronic means to 
coordinate all activities, and determine if emergency rescue is needed. Working alone in a structure 
fire does not provide a fire fighter a back-up plan if he or she gets in trouble. 
Crew integrity relies on knowing your team members and the team leader, maintaining visual contact 
(if visibility is low, teams must stay within touch or voice distance of one another), communicating 
needs and observations to the team leader, rotating to rehab, staging as a team, and watching fellow 
team members by means of a buddy system.  Crew integrity is being able to maintain a cohesive crew 
over a period of time.  Fire fighter accountability is an important aspect of fire ground safety that can 
be compromised when teams are split up.  Being able to operate as a crew and understanding one’s 
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limitations will benefit the crew’s safety and overall incident outcome. This is especially important
during interior fire attack. Names on coats, reflective shields or company numbers on helmets, and
helmet and turnout clothing colors are visual ques that fire fighters can use to maintain crew integrity 
in poor visibility. 
During this incident, the victim entered the house alone and was unable to self-rescue or be rescued 
by on scene fire fighters. 
Recommendation #4: Fire departments should ensure that adequate numbers of apparatus and 
fire fighters are on scene before initiating an offensive fire attack in a structure fire.
Discussion: Fire suppression operations should be organized to ensure that the fire department's fire 
suppression capability includes sufficient personnel, equipment, and other resources to deploy fire 
suppression resources efficiently, effectively, and safely.7 Volunteer fire departments need to identify 
minimum staffing requirements to ensure that an adequate number of members are available to
operate safely and effectively. Rural areas have a lower population density and require at least six 
people (two-in/two-out plus the incident commander and pump operator) on scene before fire
suppression operations can take place. 7   If staffing is known to be limited during the day, then 
automatic mutual aid agreements should be implemented with surrounding departments to ensure a 
timely response of resources.  Fire departments should develop and establish good working 
relationships with surrounding departments so that reciprocal assistance and mutual aid is readily
available when emergency situations escalate beyond response capabilities.  NFPA 1720 Standard for 
the Organization and Deployment of Fire Suppression Operations, Emergency Medical Operations, 
and Special Operations to the Public by Volunteer Fire Departments states that fire departments 
should have the capability for sustained operations to include: 
•	 fire suppression 
•	 engagement in search and rescue 
•	 forcible entry
•	 ventilation 
•	 preservation of property 
•	 accountability for personnel 
•	 dedicated rapid intervention team (RIT) 
•	 provision for support activities for situations that are beyond the capability of the initial 
attack
During this incident, the initial responding units consisted of a rescue truck with one fire fighter and 
an engine with the victim and a fire fighter. The next due mutual aid station did not have any 
available personnel to respond to the incident scene. This level of initial response did not meet what
is outlined in NFPA 1720 Standard for the Organization and Deployment of Fire Suppression 
Operations, Emergency Medical Operations, and Special Operations to the Public by Volunteer Fire 
Departments and is insufficient for fire fighting operations. The fire department had not outlined 
9 
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minimum staffing procedures for departmental responses. In rural areas and areas with long response 
times, automatic mutual aid should be established to ensure enough fire fighters arrive in a timely 
manner to safely perform fireground tasks.  Having only three fire fighters to sustain operations on 
the fireground negatively affected the control of the fire and overwhelmed the fire fighters that were
on scene. 
Recommendation #5: Fire departments should ensure that officers and fire fighters know how to 
evaluate risk versus gain and perform a thorough scene size-up before initiating interior strategies
and tactics. 
Discussion: Situational awareness is a highly critical aspect of human decision making: the 
understanding of what is happening around you, projecting future situation events, comprehending 
information and its relevance, and an individual’s perception.8 This is especially important when 
conducting an initial size-up. The initial size-up of the incident helps to determine the number of fire
fighters and the amount of apparatus and equipment needed to control the fire, assists in determining
the most effective point of fire attack, venting heat and smoke, and whether the attack should be 
offensive or defensive. The size-up should include an evaluation of factors such as the fire size and 
location, length of time the fire has been burning, conditions on arrival, occupancy, fuel load and 
presence of combustible or hazardous materials, exposures, time of day, and weather conditions.7 
Information on the structure itself including size, construction type, age, condition, evidence of 
renovations, lightweight construction, and loads on roof and walls will aid in determining strategies 
and tactics. Fire fighters need to consider warning signs like dense black smoke, turbulent smoke,
smoke puffing around doorframes, discolored glass, and a reverse flow of smoke back inside the 
building before making entry into a structure fire.9 The level of risk to the fire fighters must be 
balanced against the potential to save lives or property.6 
During this incident, it was reported that all occupants from the residence were accounted for. There 
was no life threatening emergency on scene that would have required fire fighters to rush into the 
house before thinking about their risks and potential gains from combating a fire with limited
staffing. Incident command was not established, fire fighters on scene had limited fire fighting 
training, manpower was insufficient for the incident, and all occupants of the house were accounted 
for prior to their arrival. A decision to combat this fire defensively until additional resources arrived
was warranted. A flashover occurred trapping the victim within the structure and overwhelming the 
fire fighters and available resources on scene. 
Recommendation #6: Fire departments should develop, implement, and enforce a written incident
management system to be followed at all emergency incident operations and ensure that officers 
and fire fighters are trained on how to implement the incident management system. 
Discussion: NFPA 1500 Standard on Fire Department Occupational Safety and Health Program4 
and NFPA 1561 Standard on Emergency Services Incident Management System6 both state that an
incident management system (IMS) should be utilized at all emergency incidents (including but not 
60 2010 NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program – Selected Investigation Reports. 
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limited to training exercises).  NFPA 1561, Chapter 3.3.29 defines the incident management system
(also known as the incident command system (ICS)) as “a system that defines the roles and 
responsibilities to be assumed by responders and the standard operating procedures to be used in the 
management and direction of emergency incidents and other functions.6 Chapter 4.1 states “the 
incident management system shall provide structure and coordination to the management of 
emergency incident operations to provide for the safety and health of emergency services 
organization (ESO) responders and other persons involved in those activities.” Chapter 4.2 states 
“The incident management system shall integrate risk management into the regular functions of 
incident command.” Each fire department or emergency services organization (ESO) should adopt an 
incident management system to manage all emergency incidents. The IMS should be defined and in 
writing and include standard operating procedure (SOPs) covering the implementation of the IMS.
The IMS should include written plans that address the requirements of different types of incidents 
that can be anticipated in each fire department’s or ESO’s jurisdiction. The IMS should address both 
routine and unusual incidents of differing types, sizes and complexities. The IMS covers more than 
just fireground operations. The IMS must cover incident command, accountability, risk management,
communications, rapid intervention crews (RIC), roles and responsibilities of the incident safety 
officer (ISO), and interoperability with multiple agencies (police, emergency medical services, state
and federal government, etc.) and surrounding jurisdictions (mutual aid responders). 
NFPA 1720 Standard for the Organization and Deployment of Fire Suppression Operations, 
Emergency Medical Operations, and Special Operations to the Public by Volunteer Fire 
Departments states, “the incident commander shall be responsible for the overall coordination and 
direction of all activities for the duration of the incident.”7 Furthermore, the incident command 
system/incident management system is a standardized on-scene incident management concept 
designed specifically to allow responders to adopt an integrated organizational structure equal to the
complexity and demands of any single incident or multiple incidents without being hindered by
jurisdictional boundaries.10 The IC has several responsibilities upon his arrival including safety and 
health of responders on scene, stabilizing the incident, developing strategies, and overall management 
of the incident. Without an IC, the safety of the fire fighter and fireground operations can be 
compromised. 
During this incident, no IC was established. The victim, FF1, and FF2 performed tasks that included 
a walk around of the house, stretching an attack line to an entry point, and setting up a water supply. 
Not having an IC to provide direction on managing the incident through sound strategies and tactics 
contributed to the fire getting out of control and fatally injuring the victim. 
Recommendation #7: Fire departments should ensure that fire fighters are trained in essential 
self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) and emergency survival skills. 
Discussion: Fire fighters must act promptly when they become lost, disoriented, injured, low on air, 
or trapped.11-16 First, they must transmit a distress signal while they still have the capability and 
sufficient air, noting their location if possible. The next step is to manually activate their PASS
1 
2010 NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program – Selected Investigation Reports.    623
Page 20
   
  
    
   
    
 
        
 
 
         
          
  
        
 
     
 
 
    
      
     
            
  
       
           
 





Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation
and Prevention Program 
2008 Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation
	
Investigation Report # F2008-34
	
Volunteer Fire Fighter Dies While Lost in Residential Structure Fire- Alabama
device. To conserve air while waiting to be rescued, fire fighters should try to stay calm, be focused 
on their situation and avoid unnecessary physical activity. They should survey their surroundings to 
get their bearings and determine potential escape routes such as windows, doors, hallways, changes in 
flooring surfaces, etc.; and stay in radio contact with the IC and other rescuers. Additionally, fire 
fighters can attract attention by maximizing the sound of their PASS device (e.g. by pointing it in an 
open direction), pointing their flashlight toward the ceiling or moving it around, and using a tool to 
make tapping noises on the floor or wall. A crew member who initiates a Mayday call for another
person should quickly try to communicate with the missing member via radio and, if unsuccessful, 
initiate another Mayday providing relevant information on the missing fire fighter’s last known 
location. 
During this incident, it was never determined whether the victim’s PASS device was heard. The
victim radioed for assistance but did not declare a Mayday. The victim was found within arms reach
of his hoseline that led outside (approximately eight feet to the door). 
Recommendation #8: Fire departments should ensure that protocols are developed to assist fire
fighters in issuing a Mayday so that fire fighters and dispatch centers know how to respond. 
Discussion: A radio transmission reporting a trapped or downed fire fighter is the highest priority
transmission that an IC can receive. Mayday transmissions must always be acknowledged and 
immediate action must be taken.11, 12 As soon as fire fighters become lost or disoriented, trapped or 
unsuccessful at finding their way out of the interior of a structural fire, they must initiate emergency
radio transmissions. A Mayday call should receive the highest communications priority from
dispatch, the IC, and all other units on-scene. Dispatchers should be trained to monitor radio traffic
so that they can assist the IC in acknowledging distress calls. Dispatchers are not exposed to
fireground noise like the IC, which may distract the IC from acknowledging radio transmissions. 
During this incident, the victim made at least two calls for help inside the house. The department did 
not have procedures for ensuring that all on-scene fire fighters and the dispatch center were aware of
the trapped fire fighter, that information crucial for locating the fire fighter was collected, and that 
organized rescue attempts were initiated.  Individual attempts to find and rescue the victim were 
unsuccessful and 58 minutes passed from the victim’s initial call for help and dispatch being notified
of the victim being in trouble. 
Recommendation #9: Fire departments should ensure that a properly trained incident safety 
officer (ISO) is established at structure fires. 
Discussion: NFPA 1521 Standard for Fire Department Safety Officer defines the role of the ISO at 
an incident scene and identifies duties such as reporting pertinent fireground information to the IC;
ensuring the department’s accountability system is in place and operational; monitoring radio
transmissions and identifying barriers to effective communications; and ensuring that established 
62 2010 NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program – Selected Investigation Reports. 
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safety zones, collapse zones and other designated hazard areas are communicated to all members on
scene.17 Although the presence of a safety officer does not diminish the responsibility of individual 
fire fighters and fire officers for safety, the ISO adds a higher level of attention and expertise to help 
the individuals. The ISO must have particular expertise in analyzing safety hazards and must know 
the particular uses and limitations of protective equipment.6 
Having an ISO standard operating procedure and an available and trained individual as an ISO on this 
incident may have prevented the victim from going into the structure alone; and could have provided 
assistance in handling the victim’s call for help.
Recommendation #10: Fire departments should ensure that a rapid intervention team (RIT) is 
established and available at structure fires. 
Discussion: A RIT should be designated and available to respond before interior attack operations 
begin. The team should report to the incident commander and be available within the incident’s 
staging area. The RIT should have all tools necessary to complete the job, e.g., search and rescue
ropes, Halligan bar and flat-head axe combo, first-aid kit, and resuscitation equipment.9 These teams 
can intervene quickly to rescue a fire fighter who is running out of breathing air, becomes 
disoriented, lost in smoke filled environments, trapped by fire, or involved in structural collapse.4 
During this incident, there were only two other fire fighters on scene when the victim radioed for 
help. Neither one of them had received training on rapid intervention or basic fire fighting. 
NFPA 1500 Standard on Fire Department Occupational Safety and Health Program, Chapter 8.8, 
Rapid Intervention for Rescue of Members, provides detailed guidelines for the deployment of rescue 
teams at emergency incidents.4 Chapter 8.8.1 states “The fire department shall provide personnel for 
the rescue of members operating at emergency incidents.” The staffing requirements set forth by 
NFPA 1720 Standard for the Organization and Development of Fire Suppression Operations, 
Emergency Medical Operations, and Special Operations to the Public by Volunteer Fire 
Departments were not met; hence, not allowing them to establish a RIT or follow a two-in/two-out
rule. Note: Although volunteer fire departments in the State of Alabama are not governed by federal 
regulations set forth by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, it is good practice that 
OSHA’s two-in/two-out rule, 29 CFR 1910.134 (g)(4)(i) be adopted and written into fire department 
standard operating procedures. 
Recommendation #11: Fire departments should ensure that properly coordinated ventilation is
conducted on structure fires. 
Discussion: Ventilation is the systematic removal of heated air, smoke, and fire gases from a burning
building and replacing them with cooler air.9 Properly coordinated ventilation can decrease how fast 
the fire spreads, increase visibility, and lower the potential for flashover or backdraft.  Proper 
ventilation reduces the threat of flashover by removing heat before combustibles in a room or 
enclosed area reach their ignition temperatures, and can reduce the risk of a backdraft by reducing the 
3 
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potential for superheated fire gases and smoke to accumulate in an enclosed area. Properly ventilating
a structure fire will reduce the tendency for rising heat, smoke, and fire gases, trapped by the roof or 
ceiling, to accumulate, bank down, and spread laterally to other areas within the structure. 
The ventilation opening may produce a chimney effect causing air movement from within a structure 
toward the opening. This air movement helps facilitate the venting of smoke, hot gases and products 
of combustion, but may also cause the fire to grow in intensity and may endanger fire fighters who 
are between the fire and the ventilation opening. For this reason, ventilation should be closely 
coordinated with hoseline placement and offensive fire suppression tactics. Close coordination means 
the hoseline is in place and ready to operate so that when ventilation occurs, the hoseline can 
overcome the increase in combustion likely to occur. If a ventilation opening is made directly above a 
fire, fire spread may be reduced, allowing fire fighters the opportunity to extinguish the fire. If the 
opening is made elsewhere, the chimney effect may actually contribute to the spread of the fire.9 
The IC needs to consider the following and how it will affect ventilation and overall control of the
fire:
• Who will ventilate (knowledge and skills)
• What type of ventilation
• When to ventilate 
• Where to ventilate 
• Why ventilate
• How to properly and safely ventilate 
The two types of ventilation are vertical and horizontal.  During vertical ventilation the natural 
convection of the heated gases creates upward currents that draw the fire and heat in the direction of 
the vertical opening. Horizontal ventilation allows for heat, smoke, and gases to escape by means of 
a doorway or window, but is highly influenced by the location and extent of the fire and should be 
cautioned if the fire is in the attic.9 
During this incident, no attempt was made to ventilate the attic fire in the house.  The original roof
layers had been covered with a tin roof which would have hindered fire fighter’s attempts to ventilate 
the roof. No windows were broken out on the first floor. 
Recommendation #12: Fire departments should ensure that driver/pump operators receive 
adequate training to operate and maintain a water supply to hoselines on the fireground. 
Discussion: NFPA 1002 Standard for Fire Apparatus Driver/Operator Professional Qualifications 
sets minimum qualifications for driver/operators. The pump operator is responsible for the life safety 
of all personnel exposed to dangerous situations that are operating hoselines being supplied by the 
pumper.18 The qualities and skill sets needed by a pump operator include an understanding of 
different types of pumping apparatus, proper apparatus placement to maximize water supply
efficiency, fire pump theory and operation, hydraulic calculations, and water supply choices.  In 
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addition, NFPA 1002 Standard for Fire Apparatus Driver/Operator Professional Qualifications 
requires any driver/operator who will be responsible for operating a fire pump to also meet
requirements of NFPA 1001 Standard for Fire Fighter Professional Qualifications for Fire Fighter 
I.3, 19 
During this incident, fire fighters from the victim’s department operated the tanker tasked with 
supplying water to fireground hoselines. The pump operator had received peer led hands-on training 
provided to him by members of this department. Fire fighters on scene recall having too much 
pressure on hoselines, not enough pressure, or seeing the pump panel unattended. The hoseline 
originally taken into the house by the victim was shut down when observed that it was flat. The 
closest section not exposed to fire was disconnected and another nozzle placed on it for use. 
Recommendation #13: Fire departments should ensure that all fire fighters engaged in fireground 
activities wear the full array of personal protective equipment (PPE) issued to them.
Discussion: NFPA 1500 Standard on Fire Department Occupational Safety and Health Program 
contains the general recommendations for fire fighter protective clothing and protective equipment.3 
Chapter 7.1.1 specifies that “the fire department shall provide each member with protective clothing
and protective equipment that is designed to provide protection from the hazards to which the
member is likely to be exposed and is suitable for the tasks that the member is expected to perform.” 
Chapter 7.1.2 states “protective clothing and protective equipment shall be used whenever the 
member is exposed or potentially exposed to the hazards for which it is provided.” Chapter 7.2.1
states “members who engage in or are exposed to the hazards of structural fire fighting shall be
provided with and shall use a protective ensemble that shall meet the applicable requirements of
NFPA 1971 Standard on Protective Ensembles for Structural Fire Fighting and Proximity Fire 
Fighting.”20 
On the day of incident, Charlie Fire Department members responded from work to the fire house to 
pick up CE1 and CE3. They responded to the incident scene without their department issued
protective ensembles. Upon arrival to the incident, Alpha Fire Department members were trying to 
control the fire and make an attempt to enter the house for the victim.  Their firefighting and rescue 
abilities were limited by the mutual aid department not having their gear with them. 
Recommendation #14: Fire departments should ensure that fire fighters are trained to react to 
PASS and SCBA low air alarms, and that procedures are developed to properly shut down and 
secure a SCBA and its PASS device. 
Discussion: During interviews, witnesses and fire fighters reported to NIOSH investigators that
audible alarms were sounding from SCBAs doffed and placed on the fireground.  NIOSH 
investigators are not sure if a PASS alarm on the victim could have been heard or distinguished from 
the alarms sounding outside. It was not determined if these alarms were from the lack of movement
or a low air alarm. With alarms sounding and no one reacting to them, it is possible that search and 
5 
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rescue operations could be hindered or important radio messages not heard or understood, especially 
a brief Mayday radio call. During this incident, the victim did transmit a radio transmission 
requesting help early in the event that was heard by one fire fighter. 
A fire fighter not reacting to the alarms is a symptom of desensitization (ignoring the sounds) and 
may cause a fire fighter to continue on with their assignment(s). If fire fighters are trained to react to
alarms by investigating, then fire fighters can focus on the source of the alarm and take a positive 
action to correct it (i.e. responding to a downed fire fighter, properly securing the SCBA, or resetting 
the PASS device). Fire departments should develop standard operating procedures or guidelines that 
address proper doffing of a SCBA that is not in use, to include: turning the cylinder off, bleeding the 
line, and resetting or securing the PASS device. 
Additionally, 
Recommendation #15: States, municipalities, and authorities having jurisdiction should consider 
requiring mandatory training for fire fighters. 
Discussion: Fire fighters have a high rate of injury death compared to other occupations.21 Fire 
fighters need to take advantage of available training and certification programs within their 
jurisdiction so that safe and sound decisions can be made on the fireground.  The state of Alabama 
has set mandatory minimal training requirements for an individual wishing to become a career fire 
fighter, but no mandatory or minimal training requirements have been set for individuals wanting to
volunteer as a fire fighter.2 Individuals may volunteer with a fire department and participate in fire 
ground activities in Alabama without being certified as a fire fighter. The state fire academy does 
offer a non-mandatory 160 hour certification course to individuals who are active volunteer members 
with a fire department and wish to become a certified volunteer fire fighter.2 This course is equivalent 
to Fire Fighter I as outlined in NFPA 1001 Standard for Fire Fighter Professional Qualifications and
can be completed over a 24 month period, but the victim and fellow fire department members had not 
taken the training. Since 2002, NIOSH has investigated three separate incidents that resulted in four 
fatalities of volunteer fire fighters in the state of Alabama.22-24 NIOSH investigators cited the lack of
training as a contributing factor in all of them.   
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Personnel Protection, Inc. Vance Kochenderfer, NIOSH Quality Assurance Specialist, National 
Personal Protective Technology Laboratory, conducted an evaluation of the victim’s self-contained
breathing apparatus. 
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Diagram. Incident scene when victim called for help. 
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One Fire Fighter Killed and Eight Fire Fighters Injured in a 




In December 2009, a 33 year old male fire
fighter died and eight fire fighters, including
a lieutenant and a junior fire fighter, were
injured in a dumpster explosion at a foundry
in Wisconsin. At 1933 hours, dispatch 
reported a dumpster fire at a foundry in a 
rural area.  Eight minutes later, the initial 
responding crews and the incident 
commander (IC) arrived on scene to find a
dumpster emitting approximately two-foot
high bluish green flames from the open top 
and having a ten-inch reddish-orange glow in 
the middle of the dumpster’s south side near 
the bottom.  The IC used an attic ladder to 
examine the contents of the dumpster: aluminum shavings, foundry floor sweepings, and a 55 gallon 
drum.  Approximately 700 gallons of water was put on the fire with no affect.  Approximately 100
gallons of foam solution, starting at 1 percent and increased to 3 percent, was then put on the fire, and 
again there was no noticeable effect.  Just over twelve minutes on scene, the contents of the dumpster
started sparking then exploded sending shrapnel and barrels into the air.  The explosion killed one fire
fighter and injured eight other fire fighters, all from the same volunteer department.  
Contributing Factors
Wet extinguishing agent applied to a combustible metal fire.
Lack of hazardous materials awareness training.
No documented site pre-plan.
Insufficient scene size-up and risk assessment.
Inadequate disposal/storage of materials.
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Report #F2009-31
One Fire Fighter Killed and Eight Fire Fighters Injured in a Dumpster
Explosion at a Foundry-Wisconsin
Key Recommendations
Ensure that high risk sites such as foundries, mills, processing plants, etc. are pre-planned by
conducting a walk through by all possible responding fire departments and that the plan is 
updated annually.




Ensure that standard operating guidelines are developed, implemented and enforced.
	
Ensure a proper scene size-up and risk assessment when responding to high risk occupancies 

such as foundries, mills, processing plants, etc.
	
Ensure a documented junior fire fighter program that addresses junior fire fighters being
	
outside the hazard zone.
	
Additionally, manufacturing facilities that use combustible metals should:
Implement measures such as a limited access disposal site and container labeling to control 
risks to emergency responders from waste fires.
Implement a bulk dry extinguishing agent storage and delivery system for the fire department.
Establish a specially trained fire brigade.
The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) initiated the Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program to examine
deaths of fire fighters in the line of duty so that fire departments, fire fighters, fire service organizations, safety experts and researchers could learn from
these incidents. The primary goal of these investigations is for NIOSH to make recommendations to prevent similar occurrences. These NIOSH
investigations are intended to reduce or prevent future fire fighter deaths and are completely separate from the rulemaking, enforcement and inspection
activities of any other federal or state agency. Under its program, NIOSH investigators interview persons with knowledge of the incident and review
available records to develop a description of the conditions and circumstances leading to the deaths in order to provide a context for the agency’s
recommendations. The NIOSH summary of these conditions and circumstances in its reports is not intended as a legal statement of facts. This summary,
as well as the conclusions and recommendations made by NIOSH, should not be used for the purpose of litigation or the adjudication of any claim.
For further information, visit the program Web site at www.cdc.gov/niosh/fire or call toll free 1-800-CDC-INFO (1-800-232-4636).
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One Fire Fighter Killed and Eight Fire Fighters Injured in a Dumpster
Explosion at a Foundry-Wisconsin
Introduction
On December 29, 2009, a 33 year old male fire fighter died and eight fire fighters, including a
lieutenant and a junior fire fighter, were injured in a dumpster explosion at a foundry in Wisconsin. On 
January 21 - 23, 2010, a general engineer from the National Institute for Occupational Safety and 
Health (NIOSH) Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program conducted an opening
meeting with the fire chief and conducted interviews with officers and fire fighters who were at the
incident scene.  The NIOSH investigator also visited the incident scene and met with the foundry’s 
legal representatives, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) representative, the
Wisconsin Department of Commerce’s Fire Protection Coordinator, the Wisconsin Department of 
Natural Resources’ Hazardous Waste Specialist, and the county sheriff’s office representatives to 
review issues related to the site.  The NIOSH investigator reviewed the officers’ and fire fighters’
training records, a video captured by the sheriff’s patrol car of part of the incident scene, dispatch 
audio tapes, the county medical examiner’s autopsy report and medical records of the injured fire
fighters.  
Fire Department
The volunteer department involved in this incident had 1 station with approximately 25 volunteer fire
fighters and 7 fire apparatus serving a population of about 1,000 residents in a geographic area of 
approximately 25 square miles. The fire department averages 20 total calls per year.
The fire department had been called to this foundry a few times in the past for the smell of smoke in
the building, but there were never any fires. The previous calls ended up being overheated drive belts 
on electrical motors.  The fire department had no documented standard operating guidelines (SOGs).    
Training and Experience
The table lists the training and experience of the primary fire fighters involved in the incident.
Fire Fighter Injured 
(yes/no)
Training Courses Years 
experience
Victim yes - fatally Fire Fighter 1, Basic Fire Investigation, 
Introductory ICS Level 100, Basic Lightweight 
Building Construction, Basic Wildland Fire
Suppression, Managing Company Tactical  
Operations, and various other administrative
and technical courses.
15
FF#1 yes Various administrative and technical courses. 1
FF#2 yes Entry Level Fire Fighter 1 and 2, Introduction 
to ICS 100 through 400, and various other
administrative and technical courses.
8.5
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FF#3 yes Fire Fighter 1, various other administrative and 
technical courses.
7
FF#4 yes Basic Fire Fighter 1, Advanced ICS, and 
various other administrative and technical 
courses.
8
FF#5 yes Entry Level Fire Fighter 1 and 2, Introduction 
to ICS 100,
Basic Wildland Fire Suppression, and various 
other administrative and technical courses.
6
FF#6 yes On the Job Fire Fighter Training 3.5
Jr FF yes On the Job Fire Fighter Training 0.3
Lieutenant yes Fire Fighter 1, Incident Command System 
(ICS) Levels 100  through 400, Introduction to 
NIMS,  The Dangers of Light weight 
Construction, and various other administrative
and technical courses.
11
Captain no Fire Fighter 1, Entry Level Firefighter Part 1 
and 2, Incident Command System (ICS) Levels 
100 through 400 and 700, Incident Command, 
Critical Incident Management Response,
Municipal Emergency Response Operations 
Part 1 and 2, Jaws of Life, and various other 
administrative and technical courses.
10 
2ndAssistant Chief no Fire Fighter 1, Entry Level Firefighter Part 1 
and 2, Entry Level Fire Officer, Incident 
Command System (ICS) Levels 100 through 
400 and 700, Incident Command, Critical 
Incident Management Response, Pipeline
Emergency Response, Jaws of Life, Wildland 
Fire Suppression, and various other
administrative and technical courses.
9.5 
1stAssistant Chief no Entry Level Firefighter Part 1 and 2, Entry
Level Driver/Operator Part 1 and 2, Incident 
Command System (ICS) Levels 100 through 
400 and 700, Incident Response to Terrorist
Bombing Awareness, Recognizing and 
Identifying Hazardous Materials, Lightweight 
29 
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Construction Dangers, Jaws of Life, and 





no Fire Fighter 1; Fire Officer I; Basic Fire
Investigation; Introductory and Level 100, 200, 
and 300 ICS; Introduction to National Incident 
Management System (NIMS); HazMat I; Basic 
Lightweight Building Construction; Basic 
Wildland Fire Suppression; Managing
Company Tactical  Operations; and, various 
other administrative and technical courses.
31 
Note: Fire Fighter 1 and 2 training met the criteria for National Fire Protection Association (NFPA)
1001, Standard for Fire Fighter Professional Qualifications, Fire Fighter I and Fire Fighter II.
Personal Protective Equipment
At the time of the incident, the victim and FF#4 were in full personal protective equipment (PPE) and 
had donned their self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) with integrated personal alert safety
system (PASS). The other injured fire fighters, the lieutenant, and IC were wearing personal protective 
equipment consisting of turnout coat and pants, a helmet, and boots.  Only the officers had portable
radios. 
Arrival Timeline of Apparatus and Personnel
1933 Hours
Dispatch reported a dumpster fire at a foundry in a rural area.  
1941 Hours
Engine #11 (E11) - Chief (Driver and IC), captain, a fire fighter, and FF #1 (injured)
Tanker #17 (T17) – 1st Assistant Chief and FF #2 (injured)
1942 Hours
Engine #14 (E14) - Lieutenant (Lt) (injured), victim, FF #3 (injured), and FF #4 (injured)
	
Equipment Truck #15 (ET15) – 2nd Assistant Chief, driver and FF#6 (injured)
	
1945 Hours
Tanker #16 (T16) – FF #5 (injured)
Personally owned vehicle (POV) – Jr FF (injured)
5 






        
    
      








        
      
        
 
         
   
     
  
          
           
      
        
  
     
        
        
   










One Volunteer Fire Fighter Killed and Eight Fire Fighters Injured in a
Dumpster Explosion at a Foundry—Wisconsin
Notes: 1) The fire department is located approximately 5 miles from the foundry.  2) See Diagram 1 for
placement of selected apparatus.
Weather
At the time of the incident, the weather conditions in the area were clear with an approximate 
temperature of 14 degrees Fahrenheit, 70 percent relative humidity, visibility 10 miles, and south-
southwest winds at approximately 10 miles per hour. 1 Prior to the incident, a substantial amount of 
snow had fallen and the parking lot had been cleared which created a 4-foot snow bank around the 
parking lot perimeter.
Site Information
The incident occurred at a recycling dumpster on the grounds of a foundry which produced aluminum 
sand castings from various aluminum alloys. The 70,000 square foot foundry has been in business for
over 73 years and currently employs over 100 people. The metal casting facility melts about 375,000
pounds of aluminum each month.  
The fire department had walked through the facility 2 years prior to the incident, but there was no
documentation and the hazards associated with the outside disposal area were not viewed or considered
at that time. Several of the volunteer members had worked at the facility and/or have relatives that
work there, thus they felt familiar with the facility.  
The dumpster was made of 3/8 to 1/4 inch thick steel and measured approximately 17 feet long by 5
feet wide by 7 feet high. The dumpster contained about a month’s worth of aluminum alloy shavings,
foundry floor sweepings (consisting of dirt, metal particles, and processing fluids), and several open 
top 55 gallon drums of slag. Note: Aluminum alloy slag is a by-product of the foundry’s casting
process and is produced during the separation of the molten aluminum alloy from impurities while in 
the aluminum casting furnaces. The slag occurs as a molten liquid melt and is a complex solution of
silicates and oxides that solidifies upon cooling. A representative dumpster and contents similar to the 
one that exploded are shown in Photo 1 and Photo 2. The dumpster was located in the southwest
corner of the foundry’s property. Dumpsters of different dimensions and contents were located in the 
same area, along with a utility pole, a commercial electrical panel box and a fenced-in electrical 
substation.
Within the previous 2 years, the foundry went from having 3 to 1 shifts per day, which reduced the 
amount of waste being produced.  When the foundry was operating under 3 shifts per day, they kept 
the 55 gallon drums of slag stacked together and separate from the aluminum alloy shavings and the 
other metal scrap.  After the reduction in shifts, the recycling company requested the foundry add the 
drums to the dumpster contents after the slag solidified, so the waste could be picked up in one load.
Keeping the drums of slag separate from the open air dumpster contents per the previous storage
method when 3 shifts were operating would ensure that no contaminates or heat transfer from the slag
could mix with the dumpster contents.
76 2010 NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program – Selected Investigation Reports. 
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One Volunteer Fire Fighter Killed and Eight Fire Fighters Injured in a
Dumpster Explosion at a Foundry—Wisconsin
Investigation
The following investigation synopsis details events leading up to the fatal incident. A deputy sheriff
patrol car video recording of the south-side of the incident scene and interviews from the on-scene fire
fighters were used to reconstruct the events leading to the incident. The victim was part of a second 
crew pulling a 1 ¾” hoseline into position when the explosion occurred.
On December 29, 2009, a 33 year old male fire fighter died and eight fire fighters including a
lieutenant and a junior fire fighter less than 18 years of age were injured in a dumpster explosion at a 
foundry in Wisconsin. At 1933 hours, dispatch reported a dumpster fire at a foundry.  At 1941 hours,
Engine 11 (E11) with the Fire Chief (IC) driving and Tanker 17 (T17) arrived on scene to find a
dumpster emitting two-foot high bluish green flames from the open top and having a ten inch reddish-
orange glow in the middle of the dumpster’s south side near the bottom.  The E11 captain manned the
pumper while FF#1 and another fire fighter pulled a 1 ¾” hoseline to the west side of the dumpster.  
The IC called for FF#2 to get the attic ladder from E11 so he could examine the contents of the 
dumpster.  After stepping on the first rung, the IC noticed aluminum shavings, foundry floor 
sweepings, and a 55 gallon drum in the dumpster. After observing the contents and color of the 
flames, the IC believed that metal cutting fluids and/or oils were burning. Two foundry employees 
were on scene and reassured the IC that no magnesium was in the dumpster.
At 1942 hours, Engine 14 (E14) and Equipment Truck 15 (ET15) arrived on scene. E14 pulled up to
the south of E11 and ET15 staged in the east side parking lot.  The IC then requested the 1st assistant
chief and another fire fighter to set up the dump tank.  With a charged hoseline, positioned 20 feet 
away from the west-side of the dumpster and standing up on a 4-foot snow bank, FF#2 began to flow
water using the fog nozzle, and was backed up by FF#1 and another fire fighter.  The lieutenant (LT)
from E14 took over the fog nozzle after telling FF#2 to put on an air pack.  The hoseline crew flowed 
approximately 700 gallons of water at 50 pounds per square inch (psi) with no affect on the fire, which 
prompted the IC to call for foam.  
At 1945 hours, Tanker 16 (T16) arrived on scene followed by a Jr FF in a privately owned vehicle 
(POV).  The Jr FF reported to the 1st assistant chief and was instructed to go to E14 to get a radio to 
listen for tool requests.  T17 left the scene to refill.  The victim and FF#4 were pulling another 1 ¾”
hoseline from E11 while FF#2 and FF#3 straightened out the hoseline (see Diagram 1).   FF#6 assisted 
T16 in backing up to the dump tank and was preparing to assist with the tender dumping.  
About 100 gallons of foam solution (approximately 6 gallons of Class A/B foam concentrate) from 
E11’s internal foam induction system, starting at 1 percent and increased to 3 percent at 100 psi, was 
put on the fire and again there was no noticeable effect.  At approximately 1953 hours, just as the IC
was calling to discontinue foam operations, the contents of the dumpster started sparking, then within 
seconds, exploded sending shrapnel and barrels into the air.  The explosion fatally injured the victim 
and injured eight other fire fighters (see Diagram 2, Diagram 3, Photo 3, Photo 4, and Photo 5).  
7 
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Fire Behavior
Key characteristics of this fire were: 
a metal fire (primarily aluminum alloy shavings) with approximately 2-foot high bluish green 
flames and a 10 inch reddish-orange glow at the bottom of the steel dumpster; 
approximately 700 gallons of water was put on the fire with no change in fire intensity and the
water turning into steam;
about 100 gallons of Class A/B foam solution was put on the fire with again no change in fire
intensity; 
then white sparks began shooting into the air and there was an explosion.
Per the state fire marshal’s report, the cause and origin of the fire is listed as undetermined and the 
cause of the explosion was a result of the fire suppression efforts and the introduction of water and 
suppressant foam.2
After conducting a combustible metal literature review, one speculative theory is that a thermite 
reaction started from aluminum shavings and particles mixed with metal oxides or silicon oxides (wet 
sand) which generated enough energy to ignite the aluminum shavings and particles.  (Note: A thermite
reaction is a pyrotechnic composition of a metal powder and a metal oxide, which produces an 
exothermic chemical reaction using aluminum as the reducing agent at high temperature.  Thermites 
can be a diverse class of compositions. The fuels are often aluminium, magnesium, calcium, titanium, 
zinc, silicon, and boron. The oxidizers can be boron(III) oxide, silicon(IV) oxide, chromium(III) oxide, 
manganese(IV) oxide, iron(III) oxide, iron(II,III) oxide, copper(II) oxide, and lead(II,III,IV) oxide.   
The most common thermite is aluminium-iron(III) oxide.)3 Once started, the thermite reaction does not 
need air from the outside to continue burning.  The addition of wet extinguishing agent (in this case,
water and a foam solution) on the fire most likely generated hydrogen gas, due to the volatile reaction 
with the aluminum, which exploded.
Factors that may have contributed to the thermite reaction are: the last slag barrel put in the dumpster 
was still too hot to touch (normally allowed to cool 24 hours but in this case only 1 ½ to 3 hours –
initial temperature of the slag (aluminum oxide) is 1425 degrees Fahrenheit when put inside barrel);
and the iron (III) oxide (commonly known as rust) in the dumpster and on the slag barrels. Note:
Thermal pattern and iron oxide on slag barrels shown in photo 2.   The melting of the snow laying on 
top of the dumpster contents may have initially started the generation and/or release of hydrogen gas.
The reaction of small aluminum shavings/particles with any or all of the above mentioned factors has 
the potential to cause a thermite reaction.  Reportedly, the slag barrel was too hot to touch and only
cooled for 1 ½ to 3 hours when placed in the dumpster.  The temperature of the slag barrel could have
been in the 700 to 800 degree Fahrenheit range and may have directly initiated the thermite reaction.
In addition to silicon oxides being part of the alloy process, the iron (III) oxide or rust on the slag
barrels and on the walls of the steel dumpster provided another means for the most common of
78 2010 NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program – Selected Investigation Reports. 
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thermite reactions (aluminum-iron (III) oxide) to occur. The thawing or melting snow could have
further hydrated the iron oxide and/or silicon oxide which could have enhanced the energy being
released when mixed with the aluminum shavings/particles to cause the ignition of the aluminum
shavings.
The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 484, Standard for Combustible Metals, Annex A 
Explanatory Material, paragraph A.13.3.3.10.3, states that the application of a wet extinguishing agent 
(particularly water hose streams) accelerates a combustible metal fire and could result in an explosion.  
In addition, paragraph A.13.3.3.10.1, states water reacting with aluminum can give off highly
flammable hydrogen gas.4,5
Contributing Factors
Occupational injuries and fatalities are often the result of one or more contributing factors or key
events in a larger sequence of events that ultimately result in the injuries or fatality. The NIOSH 
investigator identified the following items as key contributing factors in this incident that ultimately
led to the line of duty death of one fire fighter and to the injuries of eight fire fighters: 
Wet extinguishing agent applied to a combustible metal fire.
Lack of hazardous materials awareness training.
No documented site pre-plan.
Insufficient scene size-up and risk assessment
Inadequate disposal/storage of materials.
Cause of Death/Injuries
According to the medical examiner’s autopsy report, the victim died from multiple injuries as a result
of blunt force trauma. According to medical records, all of the fire fighters’ injuries were due to the
explosion resulting in debris impact and/or noise-related injuries.  Of the fire fighters injured at the 
time of the incident, the Lt had lower back and spinal cord injuries; FF #1, FF#5, FF#6 and the Jr FF
experienced temporary hearing loss; FF#2 had back pain and temporary hearing loss; FF#3 had a neck 
sprain and a bump on his head; FF#4 had second degree burns to the left elbow, right flank, and a
broken right hand.  
Recommendations
Recommendation #1: Fire departments should ensure that high risk sites such as foundries, mills, 
processing plants, etc. are pre-planned by conducting a walk through by all possible responding fire
departments and that the plan is updated annually.
Discussion: National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 1620 Standard for Pre-Incident Planning, 
2010 Edition, states that the pre-incident plan should be the foundation for decision making during an
emergency situation and provides important data that will assist the IC in developing appropriate 
strategies and tactics for managing the incident.  This standard also states that the primary purpose of a
9 
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pre-incident plan is to help responding personnel effectively manage emergencies with available
resources. Pre-incident planning involves evaluating the protection systems, building construction, 
contents, and operating procedures that can impact emergency operations.  Section 8.1 states “The pre-
incident plan shall identify and document any special hazards recognized by the authority having
jurisdiction that present extraordinary life safety challenges, operations challenges, or other challenges 
to emergency responders.”6 A pre-incident plan identifies deviations from normal operations and can 
be complex and formal, or simply a notation about a particular problem such as the presence of 
flammable liquids, explosive hazards, common attic, drop ceilings, roofing materials, modifications to 
structural building components, or structural damage from a previous fire.7,8 
In addition, NFPA 1620 outlines the steps involved in developing, maintaining, and using a pre-
incident plan by breaking the incident down into pre-, during- and post-incident phases. In the pre-
incident phase, for example, it covers factors such as physical elements and site considerations, 
occupant considerations, protection systems and water supplies, hydrant locations, and special hazard 
considerations.  The pre-incident plan should be documented, shared with other departments who 
provide mutual aid, and if possible, entered into the dispatcher’s computer so that the information is 
readily available if an incident is reported at the noted address.
In this incident, the fire department had walked through the facility 2 years prior to the incident but 
there was no documentation and the hazards associated with the outside disposal area were not 
indentified or considered at that time.  Several of the fire fighters had worked at the facility and/or 
have relatives that work there, thus they felt familiar with the facility. 
Recommendation #2: Fire departments should ensure that specialized training is acquired for high
risk sites with unique hazards, such as combustible metals.
Discussion: Fire departments often respond to complex or unique hazards which require
specialized/advanced knowledge and/or training in dealing with that hazard.  Combustible metal fires 
present unique and dangerous hazards to fire fighters which are not commonly encountered in 
conventional fire fighting operations. The temperatures encountered in a combustible metal fire far 
exceed those of a structure fire.5 
The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 484, Standard for Combustible Metals, states that it
is extremely important to conduct a good size-up by identifying the combustible metals involved, the
physical state of the metals (e.g., shavings, chips, fine dust, etc.), the location relative to other
combustible materials, and the quantity of the product involved.  NFPA 484, A.13.3.3.10.3, states that 
the application of a wet extinguishing agent (particularly water hose streams) accelerates a combustible 
metal fire and could result in an explosion.4 This is due to the water reacting with aluminum to give off
highly flammable hydrogen gas. This conversion of water into hydrogen has a heat value (British 
Thermal Units per pound (Btu/lb)) of about 2.8 times that of gasoline, assuming 100 percent 
conversion of the hydrogen in the water.  This equates to flowing 42.8 gallons per minute (gpm) of
gasoline on the fire for every 100 gpm of water.  Thus, in lieu of using a wet extinguishing agent, 
primarily water, it is recommended that a bulk dry extinguishing agent be used such as dry sand, dry
soda ash, or dry sodium chloride.  If no bulk dry agents are available, the best approach may be to 
80 2010 NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program – Selected Investigation Reports. 
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isolate the material as much as possible, protect exposures, and allow the fire to burn out naturally.5
Proper training is a must to properly identify and handle these unique fires.  Manufacturers and fire
departments with combustible metals in their jurisdiction should review Chapter 13 of the National 
Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 484: Standard on Combustible Metals.4 
Recommendation #3: Fire departments should ensure that standard operating guidelines are 
developed, implemented and enforced.
Discussion: Written SOGs enable individual fire department members an opportunity to read and 
maintain a level of assumed understanding of operational procedures. Conversely, fire departments can 
suffer when there is an absence of well developed SOGs. The NIOSH Alert, Preventing Injuries and 
Deaths of Fire Fighters identifies the need to establish and follow fire fighting policies and 
procedures.9 Guidelines and procedures should be developed based on recognized standards and best 
practices, trained upon by all potential responding personnel, and fully implemented and enforced to be
effective. The following NFPA Standards identify the need for written documentation to guide fire
fighting operations:
NFPA 1500 Fire Department Occupational Safety and Health Program states that fire departments
shall prepare and maintain policies and standard operating procedures that document the organizational 
structure, membership, roles and responsibilities, expected functions, and training requirements, 
including the following....(4) The procedures that will be employed to initiate and manage operations 
at the scene of an emergency incident. In particular, NFPA 1500, 4.2.3.1, states a risk management 
plan should include risk identification of actual and potential hazards. 10 
NFPA 1561 Standard on Emergency Services Incident Management System states that standard 
operating procedures (SOPs) shall include the requirements for implementation of the incident 
management system and shall describe the options available for application according to the needs of
each particular situation.11
Recommendation #4: Fire departments should ensure a proper scene size-up and risk assessment 
when responding to high risk occupancies such as foundries, mills, processing plants, etc.
Discussion: Per NFPA 1620, the foundry would be classified as an Industrial Occupancy and is 
defined as “an occupancy in which products are manufactured or in which processing, assembling,
mixing, packaging, finishing, decorating, or repair operations are conducted.6 When responding to a 
high-risk occupancy such as a foundry, the first arriving officer or incident commander must conduct a
proper scene size-up of the incident including a risk assessment in terms of life safety for responders
and occupants.  Size-up is defined as an ongoing process of evaluating the situation to determine what 
has happened, what is happening, and what is likely to happen.  A sufficient scene size-up should 
include:
 Type of Occupancy
 Access
1 
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 Building Construction
 Environmental Conditions




 Time of Day
 Color of Smoke
 Utilities
 Built-in Fire Protection
 Pre-Incident Planning
Based upon the type of occupancy and what is burning, the IC needs to contact and establish
communications with the occupant/facility representative regarding the situation. A relationship with
the occupant/facility representative should initially take place during a pre-incident planning visit.
NFPA 1, Fire Code states that an occupant/facility shall designate and train a liaison representative for
the fire department. A liaison shall assist in pre-incident planning and emergency response procedures
which identify the location of hazardous materials.12If there is no life safety hazard (danger to 
civilians/occupants) and the fire does not extend or threaten other parts of the facility, the IC should
stage all resources until an incident action plan is developed. Once what is burning is properly
identified, the appropriate extinguishing agent should be used. If the responding fire departments do
not have the resources needed to safely attack the fire (e.g. a bulk dry extinguishing agent for
combustible metal fires) and the fire is not threatening lives, the contents should just be allowed to 
burn out while protecting exposures.
NFPA 1500 states in Chapter 8 – Emergency Operations, that risk management principles must be
routinely employed by supervisory personnel at all levels of the incident management system to define
the limits of acceptable and unacceptable positions and functions for all members at the incident scene.
The risk to fire department members is the most important factor considered by the Incident 
Commander in determining the strategy that will be employed in each situation.10 
Recommendation #5:  Fire departments should ensure a documented junior fire fighter program
that addresses junior fire fighters being outside the hazard zone.
Discussion:  The involvement of junior fire fighters (teenagers less than 18 years of age) in the fire
service was established early in the fire service’s history.  Particularly, volunteer departments have
welcomed teenage personnel, often alongside of other family members serving in the department.  A
positive lifelong connection can be achieved when starting young people out within a fire department.  
However, being that they are under 18 years of age creates certain responsibilities for the fire
department.
Many state and federal laws govern work-related activities of youths, which protect the health/safety
and educational opportunities of young people. The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), the primary
law addressing child labor, exempts volunteer activities, however, the U.S. Department of Labor 
82 2010 NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program – Selected Investigation Reports. 
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advocates voluntary compliance with FLSA requirements for work-like volunteer activities.  In 
addition, OSHA (Federal) has jurisdiction over volunteers in an employer-employee relationship.13 In 
this case, OSHA had no jurisdiction because the employer-employee relationship did not exist.
A fire department establishing a program for junior fire fighters should document what the allowable
duties are for junior fire fighters in a department’s SOGs.  The National Volunteer Fire Council
(NVFC) has published a Junior Firefighter Program Handbook that addresses the steps of starting and 
maintaining a program, including sample documents from currently existing programs for reference.14 
The International Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC) has published Opening New Doors: Guidelines 
and Best Practices for a Successful Youth Fire Service Program.15 If a junior fire fighter would have
been near the same location of the victim, death or severe injury could have resulted.  Thus, at no time
should a junior fire fighter ever be potentially in harms way.
In this case, the junior fire fighter was aware of his duties and was not directly involved in fire
suppression.  Due to the limited area around the incident, the hazard zone encompassed where the 
apparatus were staged.  However the junior fighter could have been more safely utilized at the station 
assisting in the tanker refilling, away from the hazard zone.  The temporary hearing loss incurred was a 
result of the limited area around the incident and the unexpected intensity of an explosion.  
Recommendation #6: Fire departments should ensure all fire fighters who may operate in or near a
hazard zone, prior to approaching, have donned the full complement of personal protective
equipment, i.e., self-contained breathing apparatus and turn-out gear.
Discussion:  Although there is no evidence that the use of personal protective equipment (PPE) would 
have prevented this fatality or these injuries, this recommendation is provided as a good safety
practice.  Properties of burning metals cover a wide range.  Even when the exact metal is known, metal 
fires should never be approached without proper protective equipment. Additionally, PPE may not 
protect wearers from injuries due to contact with molten materials as this hazard exceeds design 
criteria of PPE and wearers must be aware of PPE limitations.  The toxicity of certain metals is also an 
important factor in fire suppression.  Some metals (particularly heavy metals) can be fatal if they enter
the bloodstream or their smoke fumes are inhaled.16
At any dumpster fire, fire fighters should be fully protected and on-air prior to approach; approach can 
be at a distance where cooling and control can start well before approaching the dumpster.  Fire
fighters should remember that there is nothing worth saving in a dumpster fire as the contents are
always unknown.  The dumpster may contain class A combustibles, discarded hazardous materials, or
propane tanks.  A dumpster fire is literally a potential bomb and should be treated in that way.
In this incident, only two fire fighters on scene were wearing their full complement of PPE.  
3 
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Recommendation #7: Manufacturing facilities that use combustible metals should implement 
measures such as a limited access disposal site and container labeling to control risks to emergency
responders from waste fires. 
Discussion:  Manufacturing facilities should have a standard operating procedure (SOP) for the
disposal of their manufacturing waste.  This SOP should include adequate labeling of containers and
storage areas for these wastes.  It should also identify unique hazards if the public were to come in 
contact with the waste or if fire fighters or other emergency responders were to respond to an 
emergency.  NFPA 704, Identification of the Hazards of Materials for Emergency Response, states all
buildings or areas storing, using, or handling hazardous materials be marked by use of a standardized 
placarding system.  The placarding system identifies hazard categories for health, flammability, 
reactivity and special hazards, including water reactivity and oxidizers.17 This SOP should be reviewed 
annually for any changes in the materials being stored for waste.  In addition, to help prevent 
uncontrolled dumping of unknown materials into the dumpster, a secured area may be necessary.  
Within the previous 2 years, the foundry went from having 3 to 1 shifts per day, which reduced the 
amount of waste being produced.  When the foundry was operating under 3 shifts per day, they kept 
the 55 gallon drums of slag stacked together and separate from the aluminum alloy shavings and the 
other metal scrap.  After the reduction in shifts, the recycling company requested the foundry add the 
drums to the dumpster after the slag solidified so the waste could be picked up in one load.  A safer 
procedure might be to keep the drums of slag separate from the open air dumpster contents per the
previous storage method when 3 shifts were operating.  NFPA 484, section 13.2.7.3.2, states that open 
storage of metal chips and dust particles that are readily ignitable should be isolated and segregated
from other combustible materials and metal scrap to prevent propagation of a fire.4 
In this incident, there was no labeling on the dumpster that identified the contents.  The Wisconsin 
Department of Natural Resources determined that no hazardous waste regulations were violated. 
Recommendation #8: Manufacturing facilities that use combustible metals should implement a bulk 
dry extinguishing agent storage and delivery system for the fire department.
Discussion:  Fire departments do not routinely have bulk dry extinguishing agents on hand or a method 
to implement their use. The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 484, Standard for 
Combustible Metals, Annex A Explanatory Material, paragraph A.13.3.3.10.3,  states that facilities that 
use combustible metals should provide these dry extinguishing agents in areas near where the 
combustible metals are used and stored, including scrap. These bulk dry extinguishing agents must be
kept free of moisture wherever they are stored.  A delivery system to apply the dry extinguishing
agents should be onsite, such as a front end loader and/or dump truck, and it should be available to the
fire department at all times. Note: Automatic sprinkler protection systems for areas where combustible 
metals are used or stored are not recommended.4 
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Recommendation #9: Manufacturing facilities that use combustible metals should establish a 
specially trained fire brigade.
Discussion:  A specially trained fire brigade that is knowledgeable in the permissible methods of 
fighting incipient fires within the areas that utilize or contain the combustible metals can be a very
effective means of fire protection. Only specially trained personnel should be permitted to engage in 
fire control activities; all other personnel should be evacuated.  Upon arrival of the local fire
department, all fire control activities should be by a unified incident command that includes 
knowledgeable plant personnel.4 
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This incident was investigated by Matt Bowyer, General Engineer, with the NIOSH Fire Fighter 
Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program, Division of Safety Research. The report was authored 
by Matt Bowyer.  Expert technical reviews were conducted by Deputy Chief William Goldfeder, 
Loveland-Symmes Fire Department and editor of FirefighterCloseCalls.com and by Murrey E. Loflin, 
Director, West Virginia University Fire Service Extension. A technical review was also provided by 
the National Fire Protection Association, Public Fire Protection Division.  An external chemical 
opinion on thermite reaction was given by Professor Alan Stolzenberg, Department of Chemistry, 
West Virginia University.  Additional external comments were provided by the Occupational Safety
and Health Administration’s local area office and the foundry’s legal representative and their task force 
manager.
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Diagram 1. Approximate locations of key apparatus and personnel just prior to the explosion.
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Diagram 2. Approximate location of dumpster and victim after the explosion.
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Diagram 3. Post incident scaled close-up of the scene.
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Photo 1.  A dumpster similar in size and shape to the one that exploded.  (NIOSH photo)
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Photo 2. Dumpster contents similar to the contents of the dumpster that exploded. Note thermal 
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Photo 3. Barrel that was blown from the dumpster and believed to have impacted the lieutenant 
who had been standing at that spot on the snow bank with the 1 ¾” hoseline.
(NIOSH photo)
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